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BITCOIN: ORDER WITHOUT LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS* & KYLE ROCHE** 
 Modern law makes currency a creature of the state and ultimately the value of its 
currency depends on the public’s trust in that state. While some nations are more 
capable than others at instilling public trust in the stability of their monetary 
institutions, it is nonetheless impossible for any legal system to make the 
precommitments necessary to completely isolate the governance of its money supply 
from political pressure. This proposition is true not only today, where nearly all 
government institutions manage their money supply in the form of central banking, 
but also true of past private banking regimes circulating their notes under the 
shadow of public law. However, bitcoin represents a potential third currency regime 
far more resistant to state control because it mints currency units that exist in no 
physical place, places a numerical ceiling on the number of units that can be created, 
and relies on scientific principles from cryptography to guarantee that ceiling and 
verify any person-to-person transfer. The trust required is not in any government but 
in the decentralized order of those who verify bitcoin transactions and those who 
create the software these verifiers choose to run on their connected computers. 
This Article explores the fundamental structure of bitcoin, first by demystifying it 
as a technology, and second by showing how its decentralized order contrasts with 
other currency regimes. Unlike governments that use the power of law to compel 
action, bitcoin relies on a system of built-in incentives to encourage behavior that 
benefits not only those seeking to use bitcoin, but also bitcoin miners—those who 
voluntarily undertake the task of maintaining the payment network. While currently 
bitcoin is too volatile to compete with all but the worst government-issued 
currencies, the qualities of this system may give bitcoin a long-term advantage over 
many currencies. As the bitcoin ecosystem continues to grow, its nonlegal order can 
help it climb the rungs of stability created by distrust in government. 
The technology underpinning bitcoin is the next point of innovation in the digital 
age—the same era that has already seen software create institutional disruption from 
Amazon, Facebook, and Uber, among many others. As bitcoin gains in popularity, it 
offers a platform for other kinds of technological alternatives to traditional legal 
regimes, like smart contracts. Bitcoin’s order without currency law will facilitate 
other forms of order with less law. 
This is a propitious time for fundamental examination of bitcoin. Despite 
experiencing significant speculation and volatility throughout late 2017 and early 
2018, its ten-year history demonstrates a downward trend in volatility and an 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern currency is a creature of law. In 1924, Georg Friedrich Knapp, the father 
of monetary theory, wrote that “[t]he soul of currency is not in the material of the 
pieces, but in the legal ordinances which regulate their use.”1 Knapp argued that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. GEORG FRIEDRICH KNAPP, THE STATE THEORY OF MONEY 2 (1924). 
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currency must be constituted by law since only governments can confer the requisite 
legitimacy to gain acceptance.2 Thus, the underlying value of a currency is 
intrinsically tied to the public’s trust in that legal system. 
Yet some citizens rightly have little trust in their legal system, particularly when 
it comes to currency. Nation-states can manipulate their currency, printing more 
money to fund projects for their favored supporters. The direct effects of such 
currency manipulation are felt most on its own people. Savings lose value as prices 
are driven up by inflation.3 Citizens become less certain of money as a store of value 
and economic growth suffers.4 Because currency is a creature of law, government 
control over money can be a form of oppression. 
For instance, up until recent elections,5 Argentina has been historically such a 
monetarily oppressive regime. In fact, by the end of 2015, the Argentinian peso had 
become so devalued that major international corporations for a time stopped 
accepting transactions in the currency.6 And like many other such regimes, Argentina 
tried to prevent citizens from exiting to a better monetary regime by placing 
burdensome restrictions on the amount of U.S. dollars that can be purchased.7 The 
result is that citizens use black market exchanges despite the threat of prosecution.8  
The recent advent of cryptocurrencies, bitcoin chief among them, poses both a 
practical challenge to monetarily oppressive regimes and a theoretical challenge to 
the view that the law of currency is the necessary foundation of currency. Bitcoin 
wallets are encrypted making seizure by government difficult. Bitcoin is minted by 
algorithm, not by any physical process that can be captured by agents of the state. Its 
use for payments depends on no physical entities, but instead on decentralized 
sources distributed over the internet.9 These sources update a public ledger, called 
the blockchain, which provides a complete history of all transactions. 
The algorithm also limits the minting of new bitcoins, thus making it impossible  
to artificially inflate the currency. Ingeniously, the algorithm mints new bitcoins as 
a form of payment for those who verify the blockchain, called miners. Thus, it is the 
community of miners who ultimately execute the algorithm and update the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. N. GREGORY MANKIW & WILLIAM SCARTH, MACROECONOMICS 115 (2011). 
 4. K. Peren Arin & Tolga Omay, Inflation and Growth: An Empirical Study of the Level 
and Variability Effects, in INFLATION, FISCAL POLICY AND CENTRAL BANKS 153, 159 (Leo N. 
Bartolotti ed., 2006). 
 5. In 2015, the new Argentinian President Mauricio Macri introduced drastic economic 
reforms, including the removal of certain currency controls. See Patrick Gillespie, Argentina’s 
Economy Just Got a 7-Day Makeover, CNN: BUS. (Dec. 18, 2015, 10:42 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/12/18/news/economy/argentina-how-to-fix-an-economy [https:// 
perma.cc/R4T8-ZST2]. 
 6. E.g., Patrick Gillespie, American Airlines No Longer Accepting Argentina’s Peso, 
CNN: BUS. (Nov. 25, 2015, 2:56 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25 
/news/economy/american-airlines-stops-accepting-argentina-peso [https://perma.cc/E96K 
-N7JW]. 
 7. Ken Parks, Argentina Moves to Limit Dollar Purchases, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2014, 
4:35 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/argentina-moves-to-limit-dollar-purchases 
-1409949327 [https://perma.cc/HHK4-ADER]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. For discussion of bitcoin, see infra Part II. 
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blockchain. The soul of bitcoin is not the state, but a decentralized community with 
incentives to maintain the currency. Its essence is a form of order without law.10 
Although the creation of bitcoin is impressive as a technological innovation, 
bitcoin’s central innovation is in trust—the essential characteristic of any currency 
that will have long-term success.11 Bitcoin does not require faith in any public 
institution—such as the Federal Reserve, a monarch, or any other central authority 
—but rather trust in computer logic and the effects of a decentralized order that 
maintains it.12 Thus, bitcoin is nothing less than a fundamental assault on the idea 
that a law of currency is a necessary prerequisite of modern monetary order. 
In fact, as this Article will show, bitcoin has the potential, even if that potential 
has not yet been substantially realized, to outperform the currencies produced by 
legal regimes as a store of value precisely because it requires no trust in a political 
process, but rather trust in a transparent set of rules. The regimes most susceptible to 
competition from bitcoin are the most monetarily oppressive ones because their 
citizens are most in need of an alternative to government-controlled currency. Bitcoin 
can also gain some market share because it may provide a cheaper form of payment 
system for the poor who cannot afford access to a bank, particularly those in less 
developed nations and those who want to send them remittances from abroad. 
But as bitcoin gains more users by competing against monetarily oppressive 
regimes, it may even at some point become an alternative to more established 
regimes, and this opportunity is again a direct result of the law of currency. A legal 
system cannot generally make the precommitments necessary to completely isolate 
the governance of its money supply from all political pressure.13 This proposition is 
even true of regimes that depend on independent central banks that are the 
instruments of the state—even well-established ones, like the Federal Reserve. 
 To be sure, the U.S. dollar is the world’s most trusted currency.14 Despite its 
many critics, the dollar has formed the basis for ninety percent of international trade 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. The hypothesis presented here draws on Robert Ellickson’s theory that people largely 
govern themselves by means of informal rules—social norms—that develop without the aid 
of a state or other central coordinator. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1994). Ellickson’s theory of norms was derived in part by his 
close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle 
in Shasta County, California. Id. at 3–4. Software enables humans to codify rules without 
government intervention, and the decentralized nature of bitcoin challenges many 
preconceived notions as to the necessary medium humans require to exchange value. 
 11. See, e.g., The Trust Machine, ECONOMIST (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/10/31/the-trust-machine [https://perma.cc/WY58 
-7UHR] (describing how the blockchain, the core technology underlying the bitcoin 
innovation, enables transactions between individuals who do not have an established trust 
relationship, in the absence of a third party). Part II of this Article explains what the blockchain 
is and how it functions. 
 12. See infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text. 
 13. This impossibility in the United States stems from the inability of legislatures to bind 
future legislatures. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: 
A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 385, 388–89 (2003). Thus, legislation 
can change the structure of the Federal Reserve or its objectives. 
 14. John Waggoner, U.S. Dollar Is Still the World’s Most Trusted Currency, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 12, 2010, 8:41 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2010-03-12 
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over the past thirty years because companies, consumers, and central banks around 
the world trust in the relative stability of the Federal Reserve and U.S. government.15 
Yet the dollar is also a creature of law and has been subject to periods of severe and 
unexpected inflation. Thus, a cryptocurrency bitcoin has features that ultimately 
could lead it to gain more trust than the dollar enjoys. 
 If bitcoin succeeds as currency, it will do so by climbing rungs left open by law’s 
frailties. It is already gaining some strength and stability by competing successfully 
against monetarily oppressive regimes and performing payment functions for the 
poor that bank regulations have made difficult. But as it gains stability, it becomes 
more competitive and climbs other open rungs because even the best currencies are 
subject to political risks built into the law of currency. 
Thus, bitcoin is a story of creating order without currency law at the heart of the 
economy because it can serve people better than a more centralized order of currency 
law. It is thus of jurisprudential interest because order without law has never been of 
such potential importance. Order without law is not unknown to society. Social 
norms often regulate behavior without the benefit of formal law. Rules of etiquette 
tell people how to behave at the table without causing offense. Coordination rules 
help people walk down the street without bumping into one another. In a major work, 
Robert Ellickson showed that social norms, not law, governed responsibility in a 
community of cattle ranchers and farmers for the damage caused by cattle straying 
on the range.16 
But while order without law is possible without software, software can improve 
on the enforcement of that order. The beauty of bitcoin’s design is that its mechanism 
for enforcement can not only be more powerful than the informal mechanisms that 
enforce social norms but even more powerful in some respects than the formal 
mechanisms of law. A software algorithm is not subject to the problem of defection 
from nonlegal enforcement mechanisms. But it is also not subject to the risk of 
corruption in legal mechanisms of enforcement. To be sure, the blockchain’s veracity 
is dependent on its distributed structure, but, as we will show, that structure is hard 
to corrupt because the community in charge of the software has strong incentives to 
maintain the value of the currency. 
Insofar as bitcoin succeeds, the strength of its order will not be confined to 
currency. It will help other forms of order without other forms of law besides 
currency law become a more important part of commercial norms. The routes by 
which this new form of order without law will establish its empire are already 
becoming clear. If algorithms can direct when currency will be made available for 
payment and sensors can evaluate when those conditions for payment are met, 
algorithms will in some circumstances provide an alternative to contract law as well 
as currency law.17 Thus, while bitcoin is significant as a competitor to the law 
regulating currency, it also signals new forms of competition for other aspects  of 
                                                                                                                 
 
-dollar12_CV_N.htm [https://perma.cc/TH79-8MKS]. 
 15. Yalman Onaran, Dollar Dominance Intact as U.S. Fines on Banks Raise Ire, 
BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2014, 3:54 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07 
-15/dollar-dominance-intact-as-u-s-fines-on-banks-raise-ire [https://perma.cc/5VLC-EJX2]. 
 16. See ELLICKSON, supra note 10, at 123. 
 17. For discussion, see infra Section III.A.3. 
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commercial law. Bitcoin provides a code that, if successful, will generate ever more 
code to supplement and sometimes supplant the legal code. 
Of course, law will not disappear. For instance, the general law of property and 
theft will continue to be necessary to protect those who entrust their bitcoins to 
bitcoin “hosted wallets”—service providers that manage individuals’ bitcoins.18 But 
a successful bitcoin ecosystem would create a different mixture of nonlegal order 
and law. 
This Article will examine the potential of bitcoin’s order without currency law, 
contrasting it with legal regimes that have been previously the foundation of all 
currencies. Part I begins by tracing the historical evolution up to the advent of central 
banking. It then shows how modern central banks are creatures of the state. The worst 
of them are part of monetarily oppressive regimes in which citizens cannot trust their 
currency. But even the best, like the Federal Reserve, are subject to political pressure, 
reducing the trust citizens can repose in them. This Part ends by exploring the theory 
and historical practice of so-called free banking—an alternative to centralized 
banking whereby the money supply is governed by private law. But the private 
banking law regime’s reliance on private law and brick-and-mortar institutions 
makes it readily subject to state regulation and indeed suppression. Thus, bitcoin 
represents a third modern currency regime, different from both central banks and free 
banking. 
Part II of this Article explores the emergence of bitcoin as order without law in 
currency. This Part begins by putting bitcoin into perspective when compared with 
other groundbreaking technologies of the digital age. It then proceeds to explain how 
bitcoin functions—both from a technical and theoretical perspective—to demystify 
a technology that has oftentimes been misunderstood. Part II explains the two core 
bitcoin functionalities—encryption and the blockchain—that allow it to achieve a 
sophisticated nonlegal monetary order. It concludes by discussing the incentives to 
so-called miners—those who maintain the blockchain—to maintain the value of 
bitcoin. This Part also suggests that bitcoin is more resistant to state control than 
private currencies of old because it is encrypted and has no particular jurisdiction 
where it is created or resides. Bitcoin is also gaining strength as more people use it 
and institutions, like futures exchanges, grow up around it. 
Having explored the strengths and weakness of fiat currencies in Part I, Part III 
aims to examine the benefits and costs of a monetary regime outside of state 
influence. It begins by examining why order without law in currency may offer 
greater liberty to individuals in their dealings with others, while also acting as a check 
against bad political actors. Bitcoin provides an alternative for citizens in monetarily 
oppressive regimes and for the many poor people, especially in the less developed 
world, who are unbanked. It shows that bitcoin will also facilitate smart contracts 
that will make payment intermediaries like banks superfluous and legal tender laws 
less necessary. Part III continues by addressing the many academic critiques of 
bitcoin’s potential. It argues that bitcoin’s first mover advantage will likely enable it 
to remain the cybercurrency of choice and that the incentives of miners will allow its 
software to be improved as necessary without endangering its core function and 
value. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. For discussion of wallets and their problems, see infra Section III.B.1. 
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Part IV provides a set of benchmarks for bitcoin’s success and evaluates its current 
position against these benchmarks. The benchmarks are other kinds of currencies and 
gold, and the measures of success are volatility, value, and breadth of use. The 
highest tier of success for a currency is a reserve currency, like the U.S. dollar. 
Bitcoin is nowhere near that level of success. It is already less volatile and a better 
store of value than other cryptocurrencies. 
We recognize that bitcoin is a moving target. Since we began this Article three 
years ago, bitcoin has moved from a niche interest of cryptocurrency enthusiasts to 
a phenomenon discussed almost daily in our leading newspapers. Thus, it is 
important to emphasize that our focus is not on predicting the price of bitcoin at any 
particular time, but on understanding the reasons that it is a unique innovation for 
storing value. Moreover, we recognize that the data presented in our graphs are 
merely snapshots in time that help illustrate our theories about its nature and 
prospects. They do not point to inevitable conclusions or destinations as the data will 
change in the future. 
I. CURRENCIES UNDER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 
When money is created by the rule of law, it inherits the same strengths and 
weaknesses of law. Legal regimes can create a framework of order for preserving the 
value of currency, thereby increasing users’ trust. But law relating to currency has 
three possible weaknesses in creating and maintaining trust. First, it may have 
publicly stated objectives other than maintaining value. Modern central banks, for 
instance, sometimes shape the money supply to achieve other discretionary goals, 
like increasing employment.19 Second, the agents charged with carrying out the law 
may bend it to their own interests. Today, central banks may create an artificial 
economic boom to boost the prospects of the ruling party.20 Third, political actors 
may change the law: no precommitment can be ironclad in the world of politics.21 
It is true that a stable framework for a currency is a great public good because it 
facilitates commerce and thus increases the wealth of a nation overall. But 
manipulating the currency can provide advantages to government leaders and 
political factions. And because so much is at stake in a currency, the forces for 
manipulation are sometimes strong enough to overwhelm those favoring the public 
good. Only by understanding the limits of currency law’s effectiveness can we 
understand the promise of bitcoin, an innovation that reflects neither a public nor 
private law of currency.22 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 20. See discussion infra Section I.B.2. 
 21. See discussion infra Section I.C.1. 
 22. This Part begins its exploration of currency laws in the seventeenth century. However, 
the issues pertaining to the state creation of money begin much earlier. For example, in AD 
301, Roman Emperor Diocletian issued the infamous Edictum de Pretiis Rerum Venalium, or 
the Edict on Maximum Prices. H. Michell, The Edict of Diocletian: A Study of Price Fixing in 
the Roman Empire, 13 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 1 (1947). As part of the Edict, 
Diocletian established maximum prices for the sale of goods, but continued to mass mint coins 
of low metallic value, further driving up inflation. Id. Because the Edict also set limits on 
wages, those who had fixed salaries found that their money was increasingly less valuable as 
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A. Origins of Public Law Banking Through Central Banks 
The Age of the Enlightenment dramatically transformed both the legal theory and 
practice behind social governance.23 And, while infrequently discussed, this change 
extended to the legal control of money. Precursors of modern central banking arose. 
John Locke, better known as the famous theorist of social contract, also provided 
theoretical justifications for the important but limited function of the law regulating 
currency—maintaining a stable value to facilitate commerce.  
The Dutch were early innovators in moving toward more modern currency 
practices. The Bank of Amsterdam, established in 1609, is arguably the first 
precursor of a modern central bank.24 At the time, the currency of small states 
consisted in large part of the currencies of neighboring nations.25 The Bank of 
Amsterdam began accepting both foreign and local coinage at their market value, 
and after deducting a small management fee, credited its clients the remaining value 
in banknotes.26 Because the government guaranteed this credit, this removed much 
uncertainty from Dutch banknotes.27 This encouraged merchants to not only keep 
accounts with the bank, but also trade for goods with the debt owed to them by the 
banks. The banknotes issued by the Bank of Amsterdam were superior not only in 
convenience but in trust, as foreign coinage was often clipped and worn.28 Banknotes 
with their government guarantee, in contrast, were a more reliable store of value.  
Since the international community at the time trusted its value, Dutch currency 
became greatly in demand.29 Dutch citizens benefited greatly from the bank. Because 
of trust in the continuing value of the currency, interest rates were driven to four 
percent, and as a result, the Dutch were able to finance domestic and international 
projects at favorable rates.30 
                                                                                                                 
 
artificial prices did not reflect actual costs. Id. This behavior—the willingness to use operation 
of law to constrain the transactions between private individuals—was commonplace 
throughout the Greco-Roman empires. See generally RICHARD DUNCAN-JONES, MONEY AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1998). 
 23. GERARD L. GUTEK, A HISTORY OF THE WESTERN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE 163 
(1995). 
 24. Stephen Quinn & William Roberds, The Big Problem of Large Bills: The Bank of 
Amsterdam and the Origins of Central Banking 1, 35–36 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 
Working Paper No. 2005-16, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=814004 [https://perma.cc/XP5P-3RU2]; Isabel Schnabel & Hyun Song Shin, The 
“Kipper- und Wipperzeit” and the Foundation of Public Deposit Banks 3 (Nov. 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2008/2008_258.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7ZP-ETNK]. 
 25. Quinn & Roberds, supra note 24, at 5. 
 26. Id. at 8; see also Schnabel & Shin, supra note 24, at 16. 
 27. Schnabel & Shin, supra note 24, at 17. 
 28. Id. at 16. 
 29. NATHAN LEWIS, GOLD: THE ONCE AND FUTURE MONEY 29 (2007). 
 30. Id.; see also CHRISTIAAN VAN BOCHOVE, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
DUTCH 105 (2008). These books document Dutch loans to Danish kings. While the interest 
rate was 12% in 1564, it was 5% in 1649 and 3% in 1723. See SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD 
SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 126 (4th ed. 2005). 
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Currencies then as now competed on the basis of their reliability. One often 
overlooked contribution of the Bank of Amsterdam is the competitive effect it had 
on the development of other nations’ currency regimes.31 From the early decades of 
the seventeenth century, many in England were initially bitter at the superior 
prosperity and economic growth enjoyed by the Dutch.32 However, instead of 
following the Dutch example of allowing the market to value its currency based on 
its intrinsic worth, the British attempted to use law to directly drive economic 
production rather than create a stable framework for currency which would 
encourage commerce.33 Observing that the rate of interest was lower in Holland than 
in England, mercantile theorists leapt to the conclusion that the cause of the superior 
Dutch prosperity was Holland’s low rate of interest and suggested lowering interest 
rates by regulation.34  
John Locke argued that interest rates could not be regulated in this manner.35 His 
contribution was reasoning that the prime function of government was not to 
manipulate interest rates, but simply to maintain a stable currency.36 Thus, it should 
avoid the two basic errors that had previously plagued government-issued currency. 
First, the government should not engage in debasement.37 In condemning 
debasement as a deceitful government practice he quipped that “[o]ne may as 
rationally hope to lengthen a foot, by dividing it into fifteen parts, instead of twelve, 
and calling them inches.”38 Second, the government should not try to legislate 
interest rates, which, like price controls on products, was a form of requiring money 
to be accepted under conditions determined by the government, not by the market. 
The role of the government in monetary supply was simply to fix the value of a 
currency to a stable commodity—such as gold or silver.39 
The maintenance of a stable unit of account contributed greatly to the success of 
the Bank of England.40 Because the bank provided ready access to capital, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. JOHN FRANCIS, HISTORY OF THE BANK OF ENGLAND, ITS TIMES AND TRADITIONS, FROM 
1694 TO 1844, at 322 (1862) (explaining impetus for Bank of England came from success of 
Bank of Amsterdam). 
 32. Steven C. A. Pincus, From Butterboxes to Wooden Shoes: The Shift in English 
Popular Sentiment from Anti-Dutch to Anti-French in 1670s, 38 HIST. J. 333, 337 (1995). 
 33. Kenneth Morgan, Mercantilism and the British Empire, 1688-1815, in THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF BRITISH HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE, 1688-1914, at 165, 171 (Donald Winch & 
Patrick K. O’Brien eds., 2002). 
 34. LEWIS, supra note 29, at 29.  
 35. See HOMER & SYLLA, supra note 30, at 78. 
 36. WALTER ELTIS, BRITAIN, EUROPE AND EMU 231 (2000). 
 37. 2 JOHN LOCKE, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money, in 
THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, ESQ. 73 (6th ed. 1759). 
 38. Id. 
 39.  
The reason why it should not be chang’d is this: Because the publick authority is 
guarantee for the performance of all legal contracts. But men are absolved from 
the performance of their legal contracts, if the quantity of silver under settled and 
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Id. at 72. 
 40. LEWIS, supra note 29, at 30. 
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government was less likely to devalue the currency to finance its operations.41 It is 
said in fact that the new institutions for currency formed during the Enlightenment 
“form[ed] the basis for the Industrial Revolution and the final sweeping away of the 
feudal system.”42 
B. Modern Currency Regimes 
1. A Theory of Modern Central Banking 
Modern central banking has developed against general theories of governance that 
are quite different from those of John Locke. Modern government is supposed to 
manage the economy for the benefit of the people. Thus, in keeping with this view, 
central banks are given more discretionary power to meet objectives other than 
maintenance of the stable value of the currency. By 1920, the international consensus 
suggested that a central bank was essential to help a state manage its economy in a 
sound manner.43 Central banks have evolved since then, becoming “powerful in 
setting and managing domestic policies, with a handful of central banks influential 
in the international arena, setting trends and norms which other central banks often 
emulate.”44 These objectives include promoting economic growth and 
employment.45 
It is well understood that the powers granted to a modern central bank raise in 
acute form the question of whether the government will use its power over currency 
to help the rulers. The fear is that rulers will use the discretion given to modern 
central banks to manipulate the currency to advance their reelection or for other 
partisan ends that are not in the public interest.46 Because voters value short-term 
economic growth, even if that growth comes artificially through inflation, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Douglas W. Warner, Michael A. Panton & Paul Legot, Central Banks and Central 
Bank Cooperation in the Global Financial System, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. 
L.J. 1, 3 (2010). 
 44. Id.  
 45. See, for example, the goals of the Federal Reserve: 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2012), stating 
that:  
[t]he Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Open 
Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit 
aggregates commensurate with the economy’s long run potential to increase 
production, so as to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. 
See generally Gerald Epstein, Central Banks as Agents of Economic Development 103 
(Political Econ. Research Inst., Working Paper No. 104, 2005) (stating that central banks are 
agents of economic development).  
 46. Christopher Way, Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Outcomes, 
33 COMP. POL. STUD. 196, 196–99 (2000) (“The distinctiveness of partisan policy preferences 
implies that the effects of an independent central bank are contingent on who governs.”). In 
this article, Way describes how left- and right-wing governments could use central banks.  
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manipulating the money supply to give the economy a sugar high might aid politician 
reelection.47 But in the medium and long run, few win from rampant inflation.48 
The classic response has been to make central banks independent of politicians to 
avoid the time inconsistency of popular preferences.49 Central bank independence 
supposedly functions as the formal commitment that ensures politicians do not 
manipulate the economy in the short run to the long-term detriment of society, even 
if that helps their short-term electoral interests.50 Independence thus helps foster trust 
in a currency that serves general long-term commercial interests—the kind of 
objective Locke praised. It is the financial world equivalent of Ulysses tying himself 
to the mast to resist the call of the sirens.51 
 But even if independent by law from ordinary political actors, most modern 
central banks must pursue legally established objectives other than maintaining the 
value of the currency.52 Thus, a second problem for central banks in the competition 
with bitcoin is not lawlessness but legal fidelity—fidelity to these other objectives. 
The pursuit of goals other than maintaining the value of the currency can create lack 
of trust in the currency by individual users. 
 The government can also alter the objectives and independence of a central bank. 
As a result, citizens cannot easily rely even on their expectations about its objectives 
under current law. Moreover, the structure of the central bank does not prevent a 
government from using other powers to undermine the value of and confidence in 
the currency. Recent history has provided many examples of regimes not only 
restricting the fair value of exchange with other currencies, but also preventing its 
currency from being taken outside of the nation’s borders.53  
In the Sections below, we briefly consider the substantial problems that 
monetarily oppressive regimes have in keeping the confidence of their citizens in 
their currency. These problems come from both the structure of central banks and the 
actions of governments outside central banks. Then, we will consider the monetary 
regime in the United States. While this regime creates more trust than any political 
regime for currency in the world, its focus on objectives other than maintaining value 
and its inability to exclude political influence temper that confidence and thus may 
ultimately give a new type of currency, like bitcoin, opportunities to compete even 
with money issued by the Fed.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Peter Conti-Brown, The Institutions of Federal Reserve Independence, 32 YALE J. ON 
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 50. Conti-Brown, supra note 47, at 263. 
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 52. See discussion infra Section I.B.3.  
 53. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
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2. Monetarily Oppressive Regimes 
Bitcoin currently provides the most value to monetary regimes that fail to instill 
confidence in the value of their currency because bitcoin offers a solution for the gap 
in trust between ordinary citizen and the empowered ruling class. We very briefly 
consider two regimes which undermine confidence: Argentina and China. In both 
cases, the problems include lack of confidence in the central bank and actions by the 
government distinct from the central bank that undermine confidence. Not 
surprisingly, many citizens of both nations have been enthusiastic bitcoin users. 
Perhaps the best example of the relation of a central bank that undermines 
confidence in the currency was Argentina. For example, in 2010, the president of the 
country had a plan to use 6.59 billion USD of the country’s reserves to pay off foreign 
debt.54 When the governor of the central bank—citing the central bank’s 
independence—refused to comply with this plan, he was dismissed.55 In March 2012, 
the objective of the Argentinian central bank was changed from price stability to a 
much broader mandate “to promote . . . monetary and financial stability, employment 
and economic development with social equality.”56 Additionally, the ability of the 
central bank to lend to the government was increased. As such, it is clear that the 
Argentinian central bank was pursuing several other objectives apart from 
maintaining the value of the currency, and it was thereby strongly influenced by the 
government. The result was inflationary pressure on the currency. The government 
responded to that pressure by preventing citizens from preserving their wealth by 
exchanging pesos for dollars at a market rate. As a consequence, Argentina saw a 
substantial rise in bitcoin usage.57 
China is perhaps even more important for bitcoin today. Whatever the formal 
guarantees of independence, citizens are unlikely to have confidence in China’s 
central bank because, like every other institution in China, it is ultimately subservient 
to the dictates of the Communist Party.58 Moreover, the government has restricted 
the ability of people to take their money out of the country—individuals and 
companies alike.59 While such moves are designed to shore up the currency, they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkl & Martín Rapetti, Macroeconomic Policy in Argentina 
During 2002–2013, 57 COMP. ECON. STUD. 369, 390–91 (2015); Guillermo Vuletin & Ling 
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undermine confidence in it. Not surprisingly, from 2013 up through early 2017, 
Chinese citizens engaged in more bitcoin transactions than the rest of the world 
combined because of their desire to use bitcoin as an alternative to China’s currency 
and to aid in evading capital outflow restrictions.60  
China and Argentina have been prime examples of monetarily oppressive regimes 
that have increased demand for bitcoin. But other nations with monetarily oppressive 
aspects, including Venezuela and India, have also seen boosted demand for bitcoin 
from their citizens.61 
3. The Example of the Fed 
The Federal Reserve offers the paradigm example of a modern central bank, both 
in its broad mandate to help the function of the economy and in its structure of 
putative independence. Its creation at the turn of the twentieth century marked the 
period known as the Progressive Era, during which the federal government acquired 
a variety of new powers that were thought to work for the benefit of the people.62 
The dissatisfaction with the national banking system led to a series of commissions 
and debates discussing reform, which culminated in the establishment of the Federal 
Reserve with the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.63 
Over the course of the past century, the Fed has become one of the most important 
governmental agencies in the history of American society, a transformation one 
scholar labeled “the most remarkable bureaucratic metamorphosis in American 
history.”64 It has broad power to influence the economy by both law and practice. By 
law, it is obligated to pursue full employment and economic growth as well as seek 
price stability.65 In practice, by the actions of its open market committee, it 
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substantially influences interest rates, which in turn affect the economy and value of 
the currency.  
As with the theory of central banking generally, the focus on preserving trust in 
the Federal Reserve has been to guarantee its independence. When comparing bitcoin 
to the Federal Reserve, that focus on independence is too limited. If bitcoin climbs 
the rungs of acceptability and competes with the dollar, its success will not build 
principally on the Fed’s current lack of independence but on objectives that may 
interfere with price stability and the danger and the impossibility of assuring future 
independence.  
Law is at the center of the Federal Reserve’s independence: it is the originating 
statute itself that defines it.66 The structure of the Federal Reserve is relatively simple. 
The seven members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors are nominated by 
the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.67 The full term of a governor is 
fourteen years, and appointments are staggered so that one term expires in each even-
numbered year.68 Once appointed, Federal Reserve Governors cannot be removed 
except for cause.69 The lengthy terms and staggered appointments are intended to 
contribute to the insulation of the board—and the Federal Reserve System as a 
whole—from the President who might otherwise appoint most of the board.70 
Many legal academics take this independence as a given.71 But the law of 
independence in action is weaker than the law of independence on the books.72 Most 
importantly, the practice of early resignation by Federal Reserve Board Governors 
tempers its independence.73 This practice has resulted in an appointment process 
where Presidents can appoint governors at a rate far greater than the Act originally 
envisioned.74  
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But even were the independence of the Federal Reserve in practice to match its 
ideal, its basic function can undermine trust in the currency because it has both a 
mandate to pursue objectives other than maintaining the value of the currency and 
the discretionary powers to do so. Thus, the Fed is to pursue growth and low 
unemployment as well as price stability.75 Moreover, recently, in response to the last 
financial crisis, many central banks, including the Federal Reserve, engaged in an 
unprecedented program of quantitative easing whereby the central bank purchased 
billions in mortgage-backed securities to stem the financial crisis.76 Precisely because 
this action is unprecedented, its long-term effects on the economy are hard to predict. 
Yet another factor that may lead to lack of trust is Congress’s inability to 
precommit to the independence the Fed enjoys or even to a set of social objectives. 
The Constitution prohibits legislative entrenchment—the ability for one Congress to 
bind future Congresses to its own legislation.77 Absent constitutional amendment, 
legislatures cannot ensure that the laws governing today’s Fed will be the same as 
future laws.78 In fact, the laws governing the Fed have changed quite significantly 
since the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913.79  
The U.S. government can affect the value of the currency even apart from 
changing the structure or objectives of the Federal Reserve. Famously, it was 
President Richard Nixon, not the Federal Reserve, who ended the convertibility of 
the dollar into gold.80  
Thus, the Federal Reserve illustrates features in modern central banking that may 
undermine trust in its capacity to maintain the value of currency, making it vulnerable 
to competition from other forms of currency. First, it is imperfectly independent from 
political actors who may want to influence its operations at the expense of monetary 
stability. Second, and even more importantly, its public objectives of economic 
growth and full unemployment are in tension with a sole focus on monetary stability. 
Third, Congress retains the power to further compromise its independence and create 
still more mandates that may undermine monetary stability. Lastly, the government 
can influence the value of currency outside the mechanisms of central banking. While 
the Federal Reserve does indeed create a relatively stable currency free from politics, 
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our review shows that even this excellent central bank ultimately requires trust in the 
political system and political actors. 
C. The Experiments of Private Law Banking 
In this Section, we consider the most important historic alternative to central 
banks—private law banking. We first briefly describe why theorists of modern free 
banking believe that the market can create a sound banking system through private 
law rather than public regulation. This is a system of trust in the self-interest of 
private actors, rather than in government regulation and regulators. But we then 
question whether, even assuming the soundness of such a system, government can 
be trusted to permit it to flourish. We suggest that two of the periods of relatively 
free banking in modern history—in Scotland and in the United States—were 
essentially ended by government. 
1. The Theory of Free Banking 
The Modern Free Banking (MFB) School questions “whether government has any 
legitimate role to play in producing, or regulating the private production, of monetary 
assets.”81 It has long been thought that banks issuing private currency are liable to 
failure with resulting panics because they will be tempted to issue notes in excess of 
their capitalization.82 MFB advocates, in contrast, believe that by issuing and 
circulating private currencies, banks are actually less likely to become overextended. 
According to MFB advocates, the “overissue of notes or demand deposits will not 
occur under a laissez-faire monetary regime as long as convertibility of bank 
liabilities into base money is guaranteed by each bank and the total amount of base 
money is fixed in supply.”83  
Under MFB theory, the functionality and soundness of banks derive from the 
invisible hand of markets rather than government regulation.84 Banks issue their own 
currency redeemable under specie, such as gold. If they issue too many notes given 
their capital, users will not take up the notes for fear they will lose value.85 To 
increase their notes’ salability, banks also will create efficient mechanisms, like 
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Money?, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1718, 1719–20 (1994). 
 85. WHITE, supra note 81, 31–34. 
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clearinghouses, to facilitate easy exchange of banknotes.86 To make their notes even 
more attractive and to prevent bank runs, they will also create capital cushions.87  
Consequentially, in the free banking system, banks create currency to meet public 
demand, create their own mechanisms of exchange, and do not need to coordinate 
with any central bank.88 Thus, the trust in currency does not directly require trust in 
a central bank and the political agents that control it.  
However, some doubt that trust in the market process itself is enough to discipline 
banks.89 Critics of the MFB school argue that they do not consider conditions that 
might make it impossible for the holders of private banknotes to repay their loans 
and for private bankers to refinance positions.90 But what seems to be missing from 
the debate on free banking’s merits is any discussion of a simpler question: can any 
form of laissez-faire banking exist under the shadow of public law? For the same 
reason that government cannot credibly commit to the independence of public banks 
from political considerations, they cannot credibly commit to refusing to interfere. 
As history demonstrates, treasuries will always be tempted in times of crisis or 
opportunity to end the system of private banking, so they can better control the 
currency for political purposes.91 As a result, the merits of the currencies regulated 
only by private law remain only theoretical in nature, as any system of private 
banking will always operate under the shadow of public law and can be crushed by 
it.  
2. The Termination of Free Banking 
 
a. The Dissolution of Free Banking in Scotland 
Indeed, public law has compromised and ultimately ended experiments in free 
banking even when the experiments seemed successful. Advocates of the MFB 
movement argue that Scotland, from 1695 up through 1844, serves as perhaps the 
best model for how a system of private banking should function.92 During this time, 
Scotland had no central bank and relatively few legal restrictions on the operations 
of banks.93 Moreover, after 1716, the Bank of Scotland enjoyed no substantial 
monopoly powers.94 Some have suggested that that the Scottish private banking 
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system had real virtues, most importantly in stoking innovation that served 
consumers.95 Others have suggested this free banking system contributed to 
economic growth in Scotland.96  
But any success of Scottish banking may well have been a large part of its undoing 
because it could not successfully compete against the Bank of England in the one 
place that ultimately counted in the United Kingdom—its Parliament. The Peel Acts 
brought to a close the period of free banking in Scotland. They prevented new banks 
from issuing banknotes of their own.97 While they grandfathered in the ability of 
some existing banks to issue notes, they secured the Bank of England’s position as a 
central bank that had privileges that all other banks lacked.98 Indeed, the Peel Acts 
were largely drafted by the Bank of England officials.99 
b. The Successes and Regulatory Obstacles of Free Banking in the United States 
The use of free banking in the United States is often used as a negative example 
of free banking.100 But it is not clear that history of free banking here supports the 
view that private banks cannot support a sound economy. It does, however, provide 
more evidence that private banks exist under the thumb of public law and thus are 
not likely to survive for the long term.  
What has been called the “Free Banking Era” began in 1833 with an executive 
order by President Jackson that ended the Second Bank of the United States.101 
Traditionally, bankers and historians have judged the experiments of the Free 
Banking Era as a failure.102 However, reexamination of this period has shown that 
state banknotes weren’t nearly as bad as the older accounts make out.103  
In fact, the failure rate of these state banks during the Free Banking Era was not 
particularly high.104 Arguably, failure of these state banks was not due to lack of 
government oversight, but in fact regulations that compelled banks to back their 
notes with high-risk state bonds.105 The poor performance in these states shows that 
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many systems of private banking in reality reflected an instability caused by the 
politics of public law, preferring to use banks as instruments to help state politicians. 
Ultimately, the experimentation of free banking in the United States faced substantial 
obstacles by 1864 when Congress passed a series of laws that established a new 
system of federally chartered banks, in part, to finance the war efforts.106 
These state and federal regulations again illustrate the greatest problem with 
private banking. Because banks are so important to an economy, politicians in 
government are always tempted to co-opt private banks for public ends, such as 
requiring them to hold risky government bonds, or make them scapegoats for 
economic failures. Private banking effectively depends on public law of the 
government jurisdictions in which they operate. As a result, trust in private banks, 
like that in central banks, is related to trust in those governments.  
II.  BITCOIN AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENCY WITHOUT LAW 
Until recently, there has been no widespread currency that has been the creation 
of something other than legal regimes. Cryptocurrencies, including most prominently 
bitcoin, have distinctive features that in combination make for a new kind of 
currency. Bitcoin is censorship-resistant and not controlled by any government and 
has a hard limit on amount that can be circulated.107 This development creates a 
uniquely innovative mechanism that can potentially perform the functions of 
currencies without the traditional law of currency. It not only competes with 
currencies structured under these laws, like those regulating the money supply, but 
can also offer a platform for ordering commercial transactions without as much use 
of formal law. 
Order without some forms of law is nothing new. But previously most forms of 
order without law depended on relatively close-knit communities. Thus, the most 
famous example of order without law in legal literature occurred when denizens of a 
county in South Dakota sustained an order regulating cow grazing without following 
formal rules. And there is no doubt that at times close-knit groups of individuals 
generate norms that maximize welfare, showing that law is not necessarily a 
prerequisite to social order.108 Yet while neighbors may be able to settle property 
disputes efficiently without a legal system, when the social distance between 
individuals increases, and the magnitude of disputes grows, disputants are 
increasingly likely to turn to legal rules. But bitcoin’s order without a law of currency 
regulates a supply of money and offers a payment system used by hundreds of 
thousands of people who have never met, dealing in potentially the equivalent of 
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millions of dollars. It is order without law with global reach and on a scale not 
previously seen. 
Additionally, most social mechanisms for enforcing order are quite imperfect. 
Some people are willing to pay the costs of ostracism or negative gossip or whatever 
are the adverse consequences of flouting social order. And law can regularly disrupt 
social norms: the threat of jail or fines ordered by the government overpowers the 
enforcement mechanisms of most social norms. But bitcoin uses encrypted software 
to enforce its form of order without law. The power of software permits bitcoin to 
create and transfer money through a process from which individuals cannot defect 
and which even the state has great difficulty disrupting. Bitcoin is not only an order 
of a potential currency without currency law, it is an order resistant to law that would 
destroy its regime. These characteristics permit it to compete with currencies that are 
backed by law.  
Why is bitcoin resistant to a modern-day Peel Act, in which the state decides that 
it no longer will tolerate its existence? To be clear, bitcoin is not immune to any 
action that seeks to legislate it. For the foreseeable future, the market will certainly 
react when nations either embrace or try to restrict bitcoin.  
However, bitcoin’s closest technological cousin, the internet, serves as a useful 
analogy to how technology can disrupt institutions that sovereigns may wish to 
monopolize. Bitcoin is to currency what the internet is to information. Like the 
internet, bitcoin is multijurisdictional, and thus one sovereign cannot shut it down. 
Miners can move elsewhere, and people can use it elsewhere. Additionally, if bitcoin 
proves to be popular and widely used, its advocates will make it difficult for 
governments to shut it down even within personal jurisdictions. There the analogy 
may be to the popularity of another technology phenomenon—Uber—which despite 
its disruption of incumbent taxi companies, is taking ever greater market share.109 
Moreover, we are already seeing that some important governments are embracing 
bitcoin. In the spring of 2017, Japan moved to stamp out fraud in the bitcoin 
ecosystem. It regulated bitcoin exchanges by requiring them to be audited and to 
follow a “know your customer” law.110 But in April 2017, Japan also moved to accept 
bitcoin as a legally recognized prepaid payment instrument, like a debit card, that 
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can be used to pay for goods and services.111 The result has been greater interest in 
Japan in using bitcoin.112 
In the United States, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) received an 
application to create an exchange-traded fund (ETF) to hold bitcoin.113 Such a fund 
would make it easier for people to participate in the bitcoin ecosystem because they 
would not actually have to hold bitcoins but could simply buy the fund. The SEC 
rejected this application, principally because of fears that there was fraud in buying 
and selling bitcoin through the kind of exchanges presently used, and because the 
market for bitcoin is not very liquid.114 This reasoning in our view is not entirely 
sound because the ETF would be a vehicle by which ordinary citizens could avoid 
fraud in the buying and selling of bitcoin and would make the market even more 
liquid than it is. An ETF, like the recent Japanese law, will likely increase the demand 
for bitcoin. And as described in more detail below, exchanges in the United States 
have established futures markets in bitcoin, which may not only help temper 
volatility in the long run, but promote greater use of the innovation.  
More generally, developments like those in Japan and the United States show how 
bitcoin can gain a stronger presence in the legal and economic systems of the 
developed world. As bitcoin becomes more popular and more intertwined with a 
nation’s financial system, it becomes harder for that government to move against it. 
The longer the world goes without an economic crisis, the more opportunity bitcoin 
will have to become ingrained in the financial system and avoid being made a 
scapegoat for an economic disaster. And so long as there are some jurisdictions in 
which it is legal, it becomes more difficult for governments in other jurisdictions to 
prevent citizens from using it. 
This Section describes the mechanics of bitcoin and shows how it creates a system 
of decentralized trust that can operate outside the law. Bitcoin uses software to create 
a self-enforcing order without law in two interlocking ways. First, bitcoin’s 
algorithm creates an encrypted payment system that is verified by a decentralized 
ledger—the so-called blockchain. That form of order replaces the structure of 
currency that needs middlemen like banks to execute monetary transactions between 
parties. Second, for a time specified by the algorithm, bitcoin pays some of the 
verifiers of the ledgers in bitcoin. The algorithm thus both creates bitcoin and limits 
the amount created. This aspect of the algorithm replaces the laws by which central 
banks control the money supply. We end by discussing the community whose 
decentralized order ultimately is responsible for bitcoin—the miners who process its 
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blockchain—and explain why their incentives favor the maintenance of bitcoin’s 
value as a currency.  
A. The Innovation of Decentralized Trust 
The birth of the information age has been characterized by a shift from traditional 
industries born in the Industrial Revolution to an economy based on information and 
computerization. As venture capitalist Marc Andreessen put it: “software is eating 
the world.”115 This phrase encapsulates the phenomena that evolved over the past 
few decades where software companies have been able to reinvent industries and 
displace competitors who were unable to adapt as quickly to the “software 
revolution.” From Amazon displacing the retail book industry, to Netflix displacing 
Blockbuster and the video rental industry, and most recently, to Uber’s displacement 
of the 100-year-old taxi industry, software has been upending every corner of the 
global economy. 
But while technological innovations have consistently been a disruptive force, 
they are often met with skepticism. No innovation in recent history faced this initial 
hurdle more than the internet. In the early 90s, while internet enthusiasts were touting 
its ability to change the world through a future of telecommuting workers, interactive 
libraries, and multimedia classrooms, industry giants and mainstream media mainly 
wrote off the internet as a toy for hobbyists.116  
But the average consumer now takes the internet for granted, even if they know 
nearly nothing about how it works.117 And while scam artists sometimes exploit the 
internet, the average American trusts the internet enough to exchange the most 
sensitive of personal information on it. In fact, all modern financial institutions 
depend on the internet for the validation of transactions despite the frequency of 
cyberattacks.118 
Ever since bitcoin began receiving mainstream media attention, its critics have 
echoed concerns resembling those expressed by commentators during the early years 
of the internet’s existence.119 Yet while the institutions that bitcoin is seeking to 
disrupt may be fundamental, the technology underlying bitcoin is not; it is merely 
the next point of innovation in the software revolution—the same revolution that 
created Amazon, Facebook, Uber, and Airbnb. By framing the conversation around 
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bitcoin as radical, untrustworthy, and impractical, the lessons learned from the 
previously disruptive force of software are ignored. 
But any serious debate on bitcoin requires a baseline understanding of how the 
technology functions. This next Section offers a rudimentary understanding on 
bitcoin mechanics and an appreciation of why the technology itself is 
groundbreaking. 
B. Bitcoin Explained 
From the perspective of a consumer, bitcoin is nothing more than a mobile app or 
computer program that allows users to send digital tokens—the bitcoins 
themselves—to any other consumer who has downloaded a bitcoin application.120 At 
face value, this seems unimpressive. In fact, companies like Venmo and PayPal seem 
like superior platforms, as they allow individuals to exchange actual fiat currency. 
To understand why bitcoin is innovative requires an analysis of the challenges to 
creating a digital currency that is not attached to fiat.121 
There is a fundamental difference between exchanging currency in a person-to-
person transaction versus exchanging data over the internet. When two people 
engage in a transaction for one dollar, both parties can be confident that the 
transaction has occurred. The buyer can look and feel that there is one less dollar in 
his wallet, while the seller can touch and feel the physical dollar handed over. Even 
when money is represented digitally, as in the value of a bank account, its digital 
representations can ultimately be cashed out in dollar bills. A check covers the value 
of a brokerage account when liquidated, and that check by the operation of law can 
be exchanged for currency. Thus, a structure of commercial law facilitates payments 
at a distance.122 
Creating a decentralized currency over the internet poses a unique issue—how 
can one trust that a unit of digital currency has any value without some sort of 
tangible bill or coin for which it is ultimately redeemable by operation of law? This 
is the challenge that the creator(s) of bitcoin set to solve.123 At its core, a bitcoin is 
just a string of computer code.124 Typically, computer code can be replicated with 
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relative ease. Take, for example, any document lying on your desktop. Any 
competent computer user knows that they can right click that icon and make an 
identical copy. With documents, this basic functionality of the computer is desirable. 
With a digital currency, it is fatal.  
Consider, for example, the hypothetical bitcoin user Todd. Todd has some 
bitcoins and wants to send a few to his friend Alex. Since at its core bitcoin is just a 
string of computer code, how can we trust Todd not to copy and paste his bitcoins 
and send the same bitcoins to more than one person? And even if we can trust Todd 
not to game the system, how can Todd be sure that someone else doesn’t steal his 
bitcoins? 
But Todd’s an honest man and wants to legitimately transfer his friend Alex some 
bitcoins. So, Todd decides he is going to announce to everyone on the internet: “I am 
giving Alex some bitcoins.” Todd signs the message with a private digital signature 
that only he has access to, and now the whole world can see that Todd has given Alex 
some bitcoins.125 
Todd still has a problem. How do we quantify what Todd gave to Alex? Todd 
needs a way for his digital money to act as a unit of account. Understanding this 
issue, Todd modifies his digital message to Alex: “I am Todd, and I am giving Alex 
one bitcoin, with serial number 12345.”  
However, like any transaction involving currency, this transaction requires 
trust.126 In this case, trust begins by requiring Alex to trust that Todd gave him a 
bitcoin. Historically, trust is created through some centralized authority. To enable 
their bitcoin transactions, Alex and Todd could rely on a so-called Bank of Bitcoin 
to create a ledger which keeps track of everyone’s bitcoin account. This bank would 
track all bitcoin serial numbers and their ownership, as well as verify the legitimacy 
of transactions. Now, when Todd wants to transfer his bitcoin to Alex, he signs the 
message “I, Todd, am giving Alex one bitcoin, with serial number 12345.” Before 
Alex accepts that the transaction is complete, he must ensure that: (1) the bitcoin with 
serial number 12345 belonged to Todd at the time of the transaction, and (2) Todd 
has in fact requested a transfer of that bitcoin to Alex’s account. Once Alex has 
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verified these events, he can trust that the transaction is complete and celebrate the 
fact that he is now one bitcoin richer.127 
Bitcoin now resembles a modern version of the private bank issued currencies that 
work by operation of law, as discussed in Part I. But what transforms bitcoin into a 
currency of order without law rather than one backed by law is the replacement of 
the centralized Bank of Bitcoin by a decentralized public ledger—the blockchain. 
The blockchain itself is not much more than a single giant spreadsheet that keeps a 
historical record of all transactions.128 Bankers and accountants call that a ledger. 
Any ledger needs to be maintained by someone whose role it is to make sure the data 
accurately reflects the state of transactions. 
 The naïve way of achieving a public ledger is to assume that everyone using 
bitcoin will keep a complete record of which bitcoins belong to which individuals.129 
With the bank removed, when Todd goes to send Alex bitcoin 12345, Alex checks 
his copy of the blockchain and sees that bitcoin 12345 is Todd’s to give. Alex now 
announces to everyone in the bitcoin network Todd’s transaction. Other members of 
the bitcoin network now double-check to see if Todd in fact owns bitcoin 12345. 
Once a sufficient ratio of people has confirmed Todd’s ownership, everyone updates 
their blockchain to reflect that bitcoin 12345 now belongs to Alex. Since the 
bookkeeping is now managed by every user in the bitcoin network, the Bank of 
Bitcoin no longer acts as a middleman. 
However, this system cannot work. It is irrational to think that everyone is willing 
to keep a personal bitcoin ledger and use computational resources to validate all 
transactions. To put it in economic terms, the creation of such a ledger imposes too 
many transaction costs for an order supporting currency to emerge.  
Bitcoin’s greatest innovation is the creation of a framework that incentivizes some 
people to do the work of validating transactions while making it possible for others 
to simply take advantage of the bitcoin platform. To accomplish this, bitcoin’s 
creators also needed to impose an artificial cost for network users to validate 
transactions, otherwise there would be no barrier to one person or organization 
validating all the transactions themselves. And very few would trust a currency 
validated by a single entity.130 
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The cost comes in the form of the electrical power required to solve a 
computational puzzle, known as proof of work.131 The people who do this work are 
called miners.132 To allow this proof-of-work concept to succeed, the miners need to 
be rewarded for their effort; otherwise there would be no reason for them to expend 
computational resources and the accompanying electric bills. Miners are now 
compensated in the form of newly minted bitcoins.133 Bitcoins are rewarded to the 
first miner to solve the computational puzzle associated with a new set of 
transactions, otherwise known as a “block.”134 Therefore, the more computational 
power a miner has, the more bitcoins he is likely to be rewarded. 
However, to incentivize people to continue verifying transactions even after the 
cessation of bitcoin minting, the protocol provides miners with a second source of 
revenue: transaction fees. When listing a transaction, the buyer and seller can also 
offer to pay a transaction fee, which is a bonus payment to whatever miner solves the 
puzzle required to make a block (a batch of transactions to be added to the full ledger) 
and includes the buyer-seller transaction in that new block. These fees are optional, 
but 97% of the transactions in 2014 included a fee, most often set at a default rate of 
0.0001 bitcoin. In relative terms, the transaction fees are, on average, below 0.1% of 
total transaction value.135 In comparison, domestic credit card fees can vary 
anywhere from 2% to 4% of the cost of transaction.136  
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Thus, even after 2040, when few bitcoins will be left to be minted,137 there will 
still be incentives for miners to maintain the bitcoin blockchain. As the technology 
becomes more established and more widely accepted, transaction fees could increase 
without substantially depressing demand. The fees would then progressively replace 
bitcoins themselves as the payment for miners. 
Miners prioritize processing transactions with the highest transaction fee first, so 
that persons offering a higher transaction fee will see their transactions processed 
quicker. This incentive-based supply and demand system resembles what companies 
like Uber have done with surge rates in the ride sharing industry.138 In theory,139 
bitcoin transaction fees should settle at the point where the reward equals the cost of 
computing the transaction.140 
What if miners reach different conclusions about a transaction? Usually, when a 
group of computers or electronic devices must all agree to something, a centralized 
control unit makes that call and then broadcasts it to the rest of the network. In 
bitcoin, “distributed consensus” means that the various miners that make up the 
network must come to an agreement much in the same way that humans reach 
consensus—with each member contributing their own perspective, and the group 
coming to a collective decision.141 When a miner validates a group of transactions, 
other miners must agree with its version of the network’s transaction history. The 
distributed consensus is formed when the majority of the computing power 
commanded by miners in the network confirms the proposed version of the 
transaction history. 
If someone tries to lie to the network, it is in the self-interest of the other miners, 
who each have their own version of the network’s transaction history, to call them 
out and reject it. The only way for a malicious user to manipulate the distributed 
consensus and have their own fake version of the transaction history accepted as the 
truth is by performing what is called a “51% attack.”142 A 51% attack requires the 
malicious individual to have more computing power than the rest of the network 
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combined to form a majority consensus in his own right. Since the computing power 
on the bitcoin network is nearly 100,000 times larger than the world’s 500 fastest 
supercomputers combined,143 it is insuperably difficult to fake consensus. 
C. The Nonlegal Order of Bitcoin 
Unlike any modern currency, bitcoin’s rules were designed by computer scientists 
absent oversight by lawyers or bureaucrats.144 Bitcoin’s architecture allows for 
monetary transactions between parties at distance,145 a prescribed path of money 
creation over time,146 and a complete, public transaction history.147 Anyone can 
create a bitcoin account, without charge and without any centralized vetting 
procedure—or even a requirement to provide a real name.148 Collectively, these rules 
yield a system that is understood to be more flexible, more private, and less amenable 
to regulatory oversight than other forms of payment. Since the minting of the first 
bitcoin in January 2009, bitcoin has seen remarkable growth in terms of its use, 
adoption, and economic value: 
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FIGURE 1. BITCOIN ACTIVITY TO DATE (AS OF JUN. 29, 2019)149 
 
Total Bitcoins Minted ~17.79 million 
Market Price (USD) ~$11,900 
Market Cap (USD) ~$207,500,000,000 
Transactions per Day ~394,000 




From a jurisprudential viewpoint, the most important aspect of bitcoin is how it 
creates a mechanism that can support a currency without law of currency in both the 
creation of the money supply and its payment system. It thus marks a sharp break 
from the view that currencies are always fundamentally creatures of law. In modern 
central banking systems, agents of the state make discretionary decisions about the 
money supply to achieve social objectives. However, in a fully decentralized 
monetary system, like bitcoin, no centralized authority regulates the monetary base. 
The bitcoin algorithm defines both how currency is created through the mining 
process and at what rate. 
Scarcity is necessary for any money to have value, not only because scarcity binds 
the growth of a monetary base and facilitates price stability, but also because it helps 
protect against counterfeit.150 Unlike any modern fiat systems, bitcoin achieves 
scarcity absent the legal rules that govern the authority of centralized banks to print 
money.151  
It is able to accomplish this because, unlike governments that may compel action 
through legislation, bitcoin is a system of rules that relies on private, voluntary 
ordering for establishing features that make for a viable currency. One of the most 
important of these rules was the private decision, made by Satoshi Nakamoto and 
encoded into the genesis of the bitcoin protocol, to limit the number of bitcoins that 
can ever be made. Approximately every four years, the rate of newly minted bitcoins 
rewarded is cut in half.152 After all 21 million bitcoins have been created—an event 
estimated to occur in 2140––no further bitcoins will issue.153 In stark contrast to a 
central banking authority, this design enables a predictable “expansion of the 
currency and an ultimate limit to the number of bitcoins issued.”154 This feature may 
give it an advantage in trust over fiat currencies. 
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The payment system also represents a new form of private, voluntary order. The 
decentralized ledger verifies that payments have been made. This incentive-based 
system of decentralized authority enables each individual bitcoin to be readily traced 
back through all transactions in which it was used, and thus to the start of its 
circulation. All bitcoin transactions are readable by everyone in records stored in a 
widely replicated data structure.155 The method of verification is defined by an 
algorithm—a kind of code to be sure, but not a legal code. In contrast, modern 
verification of payments depends on a middleman acting under the operation of law. 
A bank verifies that the buyer has enough money in his account to buy groceries from 
a seller. Its trustworthiness depends in part on the laws and regulations that permit 
parties to sue the bank for failure to act responsibly.  
This verification process of bitcoin also helps eliminate another problem for fiat 
currencies: counterfeiting.156 In fiat currencies, law is the last line of defense against 
counterfeiting. Counterfeiters are prosecuted and subject to heavy penalties. But 
bitcoin counters counterfeiting with the governance system set up by its algorithm. 
Consistent with the internet’s open architecture, anyone can connect multiple 
computers to the bitcoin system. However, voting on the authenticity of a block 
(batch of transactions) requires first working to solve a mathematical puzzle that is 
computationally hard to solve and imposes a not insignificant cost—electricity. 
Instead of “one person, one vote,” bitcoin’s “proof of work” scheme implements the 
principle of “one computational cycle, one vote.”157 Through this design, the proof-
of-work mechanism simultaneously discourages creating numerous fake identities 
and provides incentives to verify the blockchain.  
Bitcoin’s community of miners and their self-regulation is at the foundation of an 
order for currency without a law of currency. Miners serve as the gatekeepers to the 
underlying computer logic that not only produces bitcoins, but also validates all 
bitcoin transactions. But like any computer logic, updates are sometimes needed. 
Vulnerabilities in security are unearthed. Sometimes, as Part III will explore, 
fundamentally different visions for bitcoin need to be resolved. But unlike a 
government, which operates according to public authority, or even a corporation 
resolving disputes under the terms of its operating agreement, the community of 
individuals who participate in mining bitcoin have no legal mechanism to resolve 
disputes. 
The ingenuity in bitcoin lies not only in the physical code—which as discussed 
above, provides a payment platform with a self-enforcing constraint on supply—but 
also in how its incentive structure drives the mining community to improve the 
bitcoin ecosystem. Since miners are compensated for their efforts in bitcoins, their 
interests are closely aligned with how the international market of potential bitcoin 
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users values bitcoin. Because of this incentive structure, profit-maximizing miners 
will always seek the solution that maximizes the value of bitcoin.158  
Bitcoin’s supply is fixed. Accordingly, for it to become in any way significant to 
the global economy, two things must happen: (1) the price of bitcoin must continue 
to grow, and (2) it must become a more stable store of value in order for individuals 
to adopt it as a currency.159 Thus, the interests of bitcoin’s mining community and its 
ability to respond to the demands of the market are closely aligned with the success 
of bitcoin as a currency. As Part III will explore, the interplay of this dynamic is 
complex, and the opportunity for bitcoin to grow relies in no small part on the failure 
of certain governments to provide their citizens with a form of currency they can 
trust to maintain value. The freedom of bitcoin’s miners to solve issues organically 
represents a historic moment into witnessing how nonlegal mechanisms, made 
possible by developments in computational technology, can supplement and even 
displace a traditional governmental function. 
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BITCOIN 
While Part II explored how bitcoin’s mechanics achieve order for currency 
without a law of currency, this Part examines the benefits and costs of a monetary 
regime outside of state influence. It explains why order without law in currency may 
offer greater liberty to individuals in their dealings with others, while also acting as 
a check against bad political actors. This Part then addresses the most important 
critiques of bitcoin’s potential. It ends by sketching a picture of the world with bitcoin 
as a widely accepted and globally used currency. 
A. Advantages of Order Without Law in Currency 
Bitcoin offers an alternative to state-issued fiat, providing salutary competition to 
monetarily oppressive regimes. Its decentralized nature also enables functionality 
that traditional banking products do not offer. Just as competition in Scottish banking 
systems enabled financial product innovation in the eighteenth century, bitcoin may 
become a source for innovation in the legal and financial sectors. As more people 
use bitcoin, its price will likely stabilize, making it a competitor to less oppressive 
monetary regimes established under law, like those in developed nations. 
1. Competition to State-Issued Currencies 
In developing countries, domestic currency typically derives its value directly 
from its exchange rate with the U.S. dollar—a rate often set directly by the central 
bank of that nation.160 However, central banks in these regimes are often incapable 
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of making the precommitments necessary to encourage individuals to transact in their 
currency.161 While the threat of legal and marketplace sanctions may encourage 
banks to honor their commitments, a nation’s sovereign immunity shields it from the 
same market-driven pressures.162 In addition, political pressures to provide near-term 
economic boon can tempt central bankers into goosing the economy by way of the 
printers—a strategy that ultimately leads to devaluation of its own notes.163 Other 
governments impose currency controls that force the exchange of the nation’s 
currency at a rate above what they could command on an open currency exchange.164 
In these circumstances, citizens have little trust in the currency of the nation and 
would readily consider alternative currencies. 
Bitcoin’s greatest advantage over such state-issued currencies is that it has no 
political master to serve. Bitcoin grants an option to citizens of monetarily oppressive 
regimes to transact in something other than their state-issued currencies. In fact, 
bitcoin has gained significant market share in transactions in nations such as 
Cyprus,165 Argentina,166 and China,167 where citizens have reason to doubt the value 
of the national currency.  
For instance, bitcoin use in Argentina doubled between 2014 and 2015 when 
government action undermined the national currency.168 In Buenos Aires, there are 
roughly 150 venues that accept bitcoin, compared to 90 in London and 87 in New 
York City.169 Entrepreneurs in Argentina are offering individuals and businesses the 
ability to circumnavigate the country’s stringent currency regulations by starting up 
bitcoin exchanges and services.170 This activity has had influence on the economic 
platforms of Argentinian politicians.171 Argentina’s current reformist president, 
Mauricio Macri, was the first politician in Argentina to organize a forum on 
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bitcoin.172 His “Minister of Modernization” delivered the opening speech at the 
convention.173 
 While one might expect monetarily oppressive regimes to try to shut down 
bitcoin, it does not appear to be nearly as susceptible to the public law intervention 
that brought down private law banking. For instance, China attempted to destroy the 
viability of bitcoin as a payment system within its nation. In December of 2013, with 
Chinese demand driving bitcoin well over $1000, the People’s Bank of China banned 
Chinese financial institutions and payments companies from pricing, buying or 
selling bitcoin, or insuring bitcoin-linked products.174 The Chinese central bank then 
doubled down on its bitcoin prohibitive legislation in April of 2014, ordering 
commercial banks and payment companies to close all bitcoin-related trading 
accounts.175 As seen in Figure 2, these legislative measures had significant impact on 
bitcoin’s trading value. 
 
FIGURE 2. BITCOIN PRICE FLUCTUATION (OCT. 2013–JULY 2014)176 
 
 
But after the initial market shock, bitcoin use has been rapidly increasing in China. 
Usage, acceptance, and awareness of bitcoin significantly increased in China from 
2015 through 2016, causing the price of bitcoin to enjoy steady increases.  
China’s attack on bitcoin has failed because individuals were still able to use the 
internet to buy and exchange bitcoin, given the ubiquity of the internet and bitcoin’s 
censorship-resistant nature. Moreover, the restrictions on China’s currency that make 
bitcoin relatively attractive to its people have not subsided. For instance, China 
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enforces strict capital controls—allowing individuals to remove at most $50,000 out 
of Chinese banks—and is looking to resort to increasingly restrictive administrative 
measures to quell capital outflows that have sparked in response to the downturn in 
the Chinese economy.177 Citizens in China who purchase bitcoin are able to escape 
these capital controls, as transfer of bitcoins can be instantaneously made to 
anywhere in the world without reliance on a third-party financial institution.178 In 
May 2016, over ninety percent of bitcoin currency exchanges were still taking place 
in yuan denominations.179 
Bitcoin is most competitive against the national currencies that are most restricted 
or most unstable. Currently, as discussed below, the value of bitcoin is itself 
relatively unstable. Thus, it cannot yet successfully compete against more established 
and stable currencies. But, as we will discuss in Part IV, bitcoin has a path to become 
more generally competitive, as it gains market share and value in competition with 
the currency of monetarily oppressive regimes. 
2. Access for the Underbanked 
Many people in the world are underbanked. Two billion people, or roughly thirty 
percent of the global population, do not have access to a bank account.180 These 
people are mostly in developing nations, but even in developed nations, many people 
lack bank accounts. These unbanked individuals also represent a huge opportunity 
for bitcoin. 
While brick-and-mortar financial institutions have not reached these individuals, 
in large part because of bad government regulations,181 another aspect of the 
computational revolution—the rapid growth of smartphone use—is enabling these 
individuals to connect to the internet and thus to bitcoin. In fact, by 2020, it is 
projected that eighty percent of adults on earth will have their own smartphone.182 
These conditions are enabling entrepreneurs and venture capitalists to leverage 
bitcoin to serve those without immediate access to a global financial system. Anyone 
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with access to the internet can hold his or her own bitcoin and make global payments, 
essentially becoming their own bank. To illustrate bitcoin’s potential to serve the 
underbanked, this section will look at two problems typically faced by the 
underbanked: (1) liquidity and (2) access to credit.  
Bitcoin can enable greater liquidity among the underbanked. People lacking 
access to traditional bank accounts spent $2.1 billion in 2016 on check cashing 
services alone.183 Bitcoin can enable these consumers to receive funds sent by peers, 
employers, or lenders in digital wallets within minutes. Bitcoin users can then deploy 
these funds to pay bills and send money to family members with minimal transaction 
costs. In fact, bitcoin ATMs have recently become a popular means for the unbanked 
to gain access to something akin to a bank account.184 
Cryptocurrencies can also enable the underbanked to gain access to affordable 
credit. Typically, low income individuals often struggle to establish credit history, as 
the majority of their transactions take place in cash. Because cryptocurrencies have 
common, public ledgers that log all transactions, they can offer lenders a clear view 
into an individual’s payment history as revealed by a public wallet address. 
Companies such as BitPagos offer their customers in Argentina access to credit.185 
Users can borrow bitcoin directly from the service, with credit extended based on the 
user’s annual salary.186 Users can then pay back the loan in three- or six-month 
installments, plus interest. This system requires no credit card, bank account, or 
account maintenance fees. 
 For bitcoin to realize its potential for the underbanked, it still faces some hurdles. 
Most of the world’s poor deal in cash, and choosing bitcoin as a store of value is 
risky for those who know very little about the digital asset and few assets overall. 
Companies, like Abra, are attempting to solve this issue by building solutions that 
shield users from the complexities of bitcoin.187 When an Abra user opens his account 
on his smartphone, they see the current value of his or her bitcoin account 
denominated in local currency.188 For this amount to remain stable even as the price 
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of bitcoin goes up and down, Abra sells the risk of price fluctuation to third-party 
speculators through a maneuver that resembles hedging in the commodity and 
options markets.189 Much like the evolution of the internet over the past few decades, 
Abra is simplifying a computationally complex product to reach a broader user base 
among the less tech-savvy.  
3. Smart Contracts 
Bitcoin, and other emerging cryptocurrencies, can also enable smart contracts. A 
smart contract is a program that verifies and enforces the negotiation or performance 
of a contract.190 Instead of relying on enforcement through law, smart contracts can 
be self-executing and self-enforcing, which reduces the transaction costs associated 
with traditional contracting.191 It is an example of how the order without law that is 
bitcoin can project a nonlegal order into other areas now governed by law.  
To illustrate the functionality of a smart contract, consider a simple transaction 
where two people wish to enter a hedging contract. Imagine that these two people 
each want to put up $1000 worth of bitcoin, and execute a contract so that after a 
month, one of the individuals would receive back $1000 worth of bitcoin at whatever 
the dollar exchange rate happens to be, while the other would receive the rest of the 
bitcoin—which may or may not end up being worth more than it was at the beginning 
of the month. A smart contract would enable them to submit the bitcoin to a secure 
destination, and then automatically distribute the bitcoin at the end of the term 
without any third-party action. 
Typically, disputes about the terms of trade and external conditions triggering the 
trade are settled through whatever private law system governs.192 With a smart 
contract, there is only one determinate set of trade terms, written in computer code.193 
External conditions—like the price of oil or the cost of Google stock—can be fed in 
via a mutually agreed upon source.194 The contract then lives on the bitcoin 
blockchain and will execute when an event happens or the terms of the contract 
expire.195 Thus, bitcoin’s functionality allows such contracts to be executed wholly 
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with software and with no reliance on law, thus avoiding any issues with the friction 
and reliability of the legal system.196 
This functionality is quite different from the decision to execute contracts through 
banks, even when bank accounts enable automatic payments. First, even with 
automatic payments the bank has control over the execution of the contract features. 
As the ultimate guardian of the bank account, a bank can stop payments.197 The smart 
contract enabled by bitcoin is automatic. In a bitcoin ecosystem, there is no single 
source of control.198 With smart contracts running on a blockchain, the logic is run 
in parallel as bitcoin miners validate transactions, and the results are compared and 
confirmed via bitcoin’s distributed consensus.199 
Second, smart contracts are completely transparent, unlike payments mediated by 
the bank.200 This means that anyone can view a smart contract, and if he likes the 
logic, he can choose to use it. There can be off-the-shelf contracts for general use, 
like the hedging example illustrated previously, and more specific smart contracts 
for other needs.201  
Most importantly, smart contracts through bitcoin are not constrained by the laws 
of any jurisdiction. Bitcoin affords two or more individuals complete freedom over 
the rules that govern their engagement, as the computer logic that executes the 
contract is indifferent to the political concerns of any government. While courts in 
the United States have the power to enjoin the actions of individuals who enter a 
contract under private law, a bitcoin transaction self-executes automatically. 
Smart contracts also illustrate why bitcoin does not ultimately need legal tender 
rules by which the government requires its currency to be accepted.202 If it becomes 
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a stable currency, software can execute agreements denominated in bitcoin without 
recourse to tender law.  
While it is yet to be determined whether this form of order without law will be 
preferable to private law contract enforcement, bitcoin gives individuals a choice. As 
the user base of bitcoin grows, people can elect over a large range of contracts 
whether to contract under an order without law or under a legal regime. The market 
will determine which is superior. 
B. Criticisms of Bitcoin 
As bitcoin has gone mainstream, governments have inevitably sought to regulate 
it. The software underlying bitcoin does not provide a criminal code. It does not have 
built-in mechanisms to return bitcoins stolen by fraud, let alone the ability to 
imprison the perpetrators. Bitcoin does not collect any taxes from its users, nor does 
it set rules about what types of transactions its users can engage in. 
Governments therefore may regulate the conduct of its citizens and businesses 
who wish to transact in bitcoin.203 These regulatory regimes can exist while leaving 
the essence of bitcoin as an order without law. Order without law in a monetary 
system such as bitcoin requires independence only in the rules governing money 
supply. Unlike any of its private or public law predecessors, bitcoin guarantees its 
users an unprecedented level of trust that the value of the currency will not be 
manipulated to serve any political interests. While governments may choose to 
regulate the use of bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, the algorithm that governs the 
supply of bitcoin is resistant to government capture. Governments will undoubtedly 
seek to tax its use,204 impose anti-money laundering regulations on its deployment,205 
and criminally prosecute those who use bitcoin for nefarious uses.206 While some of 
these regulations may be less desirable than others when it comes to fostering the 
growth and adoption of bitcoin, none of them threaten the decentralized trust upon 
which bitcoin’s order without law rests or replaces its fundamental order with a law 
of currency. 
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1. Crime and Fraud in Bitcoin 
In 2010, Mt. Gox was started as one of the first bitcoin exchanges in the world—
a place where an individual could exchange euros and dollars for bitcoin.207 By 2013, 
it was responsible for up to 80% of all bitcoin trading volume.208 And by February 
of 2014, Mt. Gox had suspended bitcoin trading and announced that 750,000 bitcoins 
were missing and likely stolen—an amount that was valued at more than $350 
million at the time.209 On March 9, 2014, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy in the United 
States to temporarily halt legal action by traders who alleged the operation was a 
fraud.210 Bitcoin experts and law enforcement have spent over two years trying to 
figure out how hundreds of thousands of bitcoins disappeared from the exchange 
overnight.  
More recently, on August 2, 2016, Bitfinex—a Hong Kong-based cryptocurrency 
exchange—became the latest to declare itself a victim of a major security breach. 
Private bitcoin wallets were hacked and consumer funds were stolen, awakening the 
ghost of the Mt. Gox debacle.211 In total, Bitfinex lost approximately $66 million 
worth of bitcoin, or roughly about 18% of what was lost during the Mt. Gox heist.212 
And like the Mt. Gox downfall, the Bitifinex hack had a significant impact on the 
price of bitcoin, tumbling as much as 20% as the hack shook the public’s trust in 
bitcoin.213 
At first glance, the failures at Mt. Gox and Bitfinex seem to highlight a need for 
greater consumer protection when dealing with bitcoin wallet providers. Services 
such as Mt. Gox and Bitfinex, that offer individuals a user-friendly interface to 
engage in bitcoin transactions, seem to be susceptible to fraudulent attacks. In the 
wake of both incidents, regulators and politicians have been quick to blame the 
decentralized nature of bitcoin for the loss of consumer assets. 
But the problem with Mt. Gox and Bitfinex did not lie with bitcoin, but with 
companies whose business is holding bitcoin. First, the Mt. Gox and Bitfinex hacks 
do not reflect on the security of the bitcoin network. The bitcoin network itself has 
never been hacked.214 Second, the ordinary processes of criminal law may be used to 
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reinforce bitcoin’s order without currency law. Those responsible for hacking Mt. 
Gox and Bitfinex may be prosecuted. 
Moreover, in the wake of the Mt. Gox collapse, a wide variety of startups began 
to hold bitcoins for their parties, with established entrepreneurs and venture 
capitalists getting involved.215 Thus, the basic laws of crime and property together 
with market innovation can reinforce the basic order without law that is bitcoin.  
Bitcoin has also been criticized because of its connection to criminal activity. The 
most infamous example of this illicit use was Silk Road, an online black market best 
known as a platform for selling drugs. Silk Road was enabled, in part, through the 
anonymous transfer of value through bitcoin. By the end of 2013, it was estimated 
that approximately $1.2 billion worth of trades had been facilitated by the 
underground network.216 Here, again, the ordinary process of law intervened. The 
mastermind of Silk Road was arrested and sentenced to life in prison, creating a large 
deterrent to such activities.217 Thus, it is important to acknowledge that while bitcoin 
works without a law of currency, its overall utility is still dependent on other orders 
that are rooted in law. As a result, bitcoin no less than other innovations is dependent 
on the neutral and fair legal regulation of the ecosystem that inevitably grows up to 
surround an innovation.  
2. Bitcoin’s Governance 
One of the core characteristics of bitcoin, its governance model, has drawn 
significant criticism. Compared with conventional payment systems, bitcoin lacks a 
governance structure other than its underlying software. This has several 
implications for the functioning of the system. First, bitcoin payments are irreversible 
in that the protocol provides no way for a payer to reverse an accidental or unwanted 
purchase, whereas other payment platforms, such as credit cards, do include such 
procedures.218 These design decisions are intentional—simplifying the bitcoin 
platform and reducing the need for central arbiters. While it may have a cost, the 
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payment system competes with others that do not have this feature and the market 
will decide when one payment system is used in preference to others.  
But the more fundamental criticism of bitcoin’s governance model lies in the 
mechanisms required to update the network.219 The blockchain is decentralized, 
which means there is no absolutely “correct” chain. Any miner wishing to take part 
in the economic incentives of the bitcoin network downloads the accepted version of 
the blockchain, verifies new transactions against the laws of math and bitcoin, and 
chooses the correct chain accordingly. Every so often there is disagreement in the 
network as to how a miner “validated” a transaction. Miners tend to quickly converge 
to an accepted solution because of the profit-related motives in ensuring a 
consensus.220 
Like any piece of software, sometimes change is needed to meet some type of 
technical demand. For most of its history, bitcoin has benefited from a group of core 
developers who have contributed and volunteered time to work on the bitcoin 
code.221 Since bitcoin is not under their control, miners must each individually adopt 
any updates for the desired changes to take effect. For most of the history of bitcoin, 
these changes have been relatively uncontroversial and universally adopted by the 
mining community.222 
But from 2015 to August 2017, bitcoin’s mining community faced the most 
deeply contested debate concerning its future development, which was dubbed the 
“forking hell.”223 Under the previous version of the software, the bitcoin network 
could handle only about 350,000 transactions per day. At bitcoin’s inception, this 
limit was hardly seen as a constraint, but as Figure 3 shows, the network is fast 
approaching this upper limit. 
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FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF BITCOIN TRANSACTIONS PER DAY  
(FEB. 2016–FEB. 2017)224 
 
 
The solution to increasing the number of transactions the bitcoin network can 
handle in a given day is, from a technical perspective, relatively straightforward.225 
Essentially, all that needs to be done is to change the amount of transactions 
processed in each “block”—the bundle of transactions that miners gather every ten 
minutes—to something that would allow miners to meet future demand.226 However, 
the question of how much to increase the threshold has economic effects.227 Any 
increase in the threshold would increase the requisite computing power necessary for 
an individual to keep a complete record of all transactions being added to the 
blockchain, which could result in a consolidation in the individuals capable of 
meeting these requirements.228 The disagreement drove a schism between those who 
seek to expand bitcoin’s global adoption with those who desire that bitcoin remain 
as decentralized as possible.229 Many thought an actual fork between these two 
factions would be fatal to the bitcoin experiment.230 
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On August 1, 2017, this schism culminated into bitcoin forking into two separate 
cryptocurrencies: bitcoin and bitcoin cash.231 Each individual who owned bitcoin 
prior to the fork acquired equal parts bitcoin and bitcoin cash overnight, with each 
individual’s balances reflected on the two new, independent blockchains.232 But 
bitcoin’s fork coincided with a substantial rise in bitcoin’s value—not its demise. In 
the months following the fork, bitcoin’s price soared, and even after a significant 
correction in 2018, its price still dwarfs pre-fork levels.233 
Indeed, the experience of this fork may suggest that permitting forks may have 
certain advantages. Forks may allow a cryptocurrency to create new currencies that 
are better optimized for different uses. In this case, bitcoin cash may be better suited 
to buying goods and services and bitcoin itself better suited to being held as an 
investment. Bitcoin cash more easily accommodates a greater number of transactions 
while bitcoin, with its more decentralized group of miners, might be thought less 
easy to manipulate.  
Perhaps most importantly, forks permit the market to decide which qualities of a 
cryptocurrency they find the most valuable. In today’s systems of modern centralized 
banking, individuals have no direct input into the rules that govern their nation’s 
currency. However, bitcoin enables individuals to optimize its features to make it a 
more desirable currency, and then to test that desirability on a global level.  
Historical mechanisms of order without law depend on tradition to bind a society, 
and these mechanisms can take generations to take effect. While it is ingrained in 
many to place their forks to the left of their plate, any coordinated effort to change 
this behavior would likely fail, even if it was discovered that there was some utility 
to having forks placed to the right of the plate. With bitcoin, rules are only 
programmed in software so long as society finds them desirable. If society ends up 
determining that bitcoin cash is much more desirable than bitcoin, individuals can 
simply choose to buy it instead. 
In any event, for holders of the original bitcoin, the fork has been better than a 
stock split because the value of their combined holding is greater than before the 
fork. Ultimately, the market of cryptocurrency users will determine the relative value 
of bitcoin and bitcoin cash—a decision the market will make without influence from 
a centralized state authority. 
3. Competing Cryptocurrencies 
Critics argue that since there is minimal barrier of entry to creating a new 
cryptocurrency, bitcoin’s value will eventually plummet as other cryptocurrencies 
enter the market and undercut the price of bitcoin relative to the dollar.234  
These arguments flow from a flawed understanding of how bitcoin works. Unlike 
state-controlled currencies, such as the Chinese yuan or the Argentinian peso, 
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cryptocurrencies are decentralized networks that have no price setting functionality. 
Bitcoin’s exchange rate is determined exclusively by supply and demand, and thus, 
the network of buyers and sellers determine what bitcoin, or any other 
cryptocurrency, is worth. Even in the hypothetical where sophisticated actors, such 
as corporations or banks, create a cryptocurrency and fix a predetermined initial price 
that is a function of marketing costs as opposed to demand, it is likely there will be 
no buyers for these currencies. As the seventeenth century attempts by the British 
government to artificially fix interest rates prove, currency cannot be completely 
shielded from competitive effects. 
Bitcoin has significant infrastructural advantages over other potential 
cryptocurrencies that are likely to maintain demand for it and weaken demand for 
competing currencies. First, bitcoin enjoys a sizable network effect over alternative 
cryptocurrencies. Most people who hear about digital currencies hear about them in 
the context of bitcoin. Additionally, any competing currency would likely face 
significant obstacles gaining adoption among merchants. Evidence of these types of 
network effects can be seen in other disruptive industries such as ridesharing.235 In 
fact, with one exception, there have been no alternative cryptocurrencies that have 
seriously challenged bitcoin’s throne as the dominant cryptocurrency.236 
And at bitcoin’s current stage, another currency is unlikely to have much effect 
on bitcoin price because any new cryptocurrency is likely to gain market share by 
displacing other currencies rather than bitcoin, given that bitcoin still has a small 
market share when compared to the global currency market. The rise of ethereum is 
a prime example of the room for growth in the economy of cryptocurrencies. Unlike 
bitcoin, which was primarily designed to serve as a currency for consumer payment 
transaction, the ethereum blockchain includes more features that appeal to the 
corporate world.237 And indeed, it has attracted quite significant attention, as 
corporate giants such as JPMorgan, Microsoft, and Intel Corporation are working 
together to build enterprise-level functionality on top of the ethereum blockchain.238 
And while this activity has brought incredible growth to the price of ethereum, 
and many other cryptocurrencies, throughout 2017, bitcoin’s price has grown 
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significantly in tandem.239 What we are witnessing is the beginning of an “economy 
of cryptos.” As different cryptocurrencies evolve to meet different market demands, 
individuals may acquire and trade between different cryptocurrencies, and in the 
process, rely less and less on the use of traditional fiat. 
4. Bitcoin Price Stability 
Perhaps the most critical precondition to widespread adoption of bitcoin as a 
means of exchange is price stability. As the CEO of Goldman Sachs put it, 
“[s]omething that moves up and down 20 percent in a day doesn’t feel like a 
currency, doesn’t feel like a store of value.”240 Indeed, as demonstrated below, for 
most of bitcoin’s history, it has behaved much more like a commodity than a 
currency.  
 
FIGURE 4. BITCOIN VOLATILITY VS. OTHER COMMODITIES  
(JAN. 1, 2012–JUN. 29, 2019)241 
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More recently, bitcoin experienced rapid price growth in 2017 due to a rush of 
new market entrants seeking to purchase bitcoin, before the market corrected and 
reached significantly lower levels of volatility in 2018. While this demonstrates that 
bitcoin, like the internet, is subject to significant speculation in boom times, it does 
not represent some inherent flaw. History has demonstrated that technological 
innovations are typically followed by financial bubbles as markets take time to price 
innovation.242 
Indeed, many commentators incorrectly conflate bitcoin’s current volatility with 
some structural, underlying flaw in bitcoin itself. As discussed in Part IV, it is 
impossible to analyze bitcoin’s volatility without the context that it is still a new asset 
class and without recognizing that the market around it is slowly maturing. It would 
be seemingly impossible for bitcoin adoption to grow anywhere near that of the U.S. 
dollar without short- to medium-term volatility. And volatility itself is not an intrinsic 
property of bitcoin, but rather a current reflection of its marketplace, which as 
discussed, can grow more sophisticated overtime. 
Bitcoin’s fixed supply—only 21 million will ever be created at a rate 
precommitted by lines of code—means that one side of its supply and demand curve 
is entirely predictable. What is far more complex, and more important to driving 
bitcoin’s long-term pricing stability is its demand. Bitcoin faces a classic chicken and 
egg dilemma: for it to be an attractive currency, it needs to be a stable store of value, 
but for it to be a stable store of value, it needs to gain greater adoption as a currency.  
Bitcoin’s recent price swings certainly call into question its long-term capacity 
for acting as a store of value. Starting in 2017, bitcoin saw dramatic increases in its 
price, peaking at a value close to $20,000 with a market cap well north of $300 
billion before retracing nearly 80% of its gains by the end of 2018: 
 
FIGURE 5. BITCOIN PRICE  
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Explanations for bitcoin’s bubble in late 2017 and 2018 are elusive. One 
potential explanation is that early adopters of the cryptocurrency, known as bitcoin 
“whales,” have an outsized influence over the price of bitcoin.244 The lack of 
market regulation in the bitcoin market enables powerful groups of traders to inject 
large quantities of bitcoin into the open market, increasing the available supply, and 
putting downward pressure on the price of bitcoin. Some have speculated that the 
advent of bitcoin futures in early 2018 led to “massive market manipulation and 
suppression” by bitcoin whales.245  
While this might seem like an insurmountable dilemma, bitcoin’s ability to 
compete among all currencies, rather than say just the U.S. dollar, offers it a 
significant advantage. Additionally, as the market continues to mature, the impact of 
this overhang of individuals with outsized positions in the bitcoin market should 
diminish as they continue to diversify their assets and exit from their early adopter 
positions. Indeed, some have pointed out that the introduction of a bitcoin ETF in the 
United States could help ease the negative impacts of market manipulation.246 
This Section previously explored bitcoin’s ability to serve those in monetarily 
oppressive regimes and underbanked. As bitcoin gains adoption among those with 
inferior alternatives, that adoption will also help stabilize its prices and will help spur 
its use against alternatives that are now better. In Part IV, we outline some 
benchmarks for bitcoin’s progress.247 
5. Bitcoin’s Deflationary Model 
Central banks are supposed to keep a stable currency by issuing money at rates 
that match the goods and services exchanged in an economy. For instance, in the 
United States, the Fed increases the money supply.248 For bitcoin, there is no central 
authority that can regulate the money base.249 Instead the bitcoin algorithm defines, 
in advance, how currency is created and at what rate.250 
Bitcoin’s inability to match the amount of its currency with the growth of goods 
and services could lead to deflation and represents a common criticism of this 
innovation. It has been said that runaway deflation can eventually lead to substantial 
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damage to an economy given certain conditions and constraints.251 For instance, it is 
feared that companies and people may defer investments and spending because their 
holdings will go up in value along with the currency.252  
This is a large and speculative issue which this Article does not have adequate 
space to address. It is large because it addresses fundamental issues of monetary 
theory. It is speculative because unless bitcoin becomes dominant and the unit of 
account in a nation, it is unlikely to create these problems because transactions will 
be carried out in other currency. Nevertheless, it is worth noting very briefly three 
possible responses to this criticism.  
First, some recent research has challenged the historical account of deflation as a 
destabilizing force.253 Since World War II, there has been more than 100 years of 
short-term deflation across thirty-eight economies.254 The average growth rate during 
those periods was found to be higher than those found during periods of normal 
inflation.255 This research raises questions about the prevailing view that price 
deflation in goods and services, even if persistent, is pernicious. 
Second, while historical debate regarding the effects of deflation continues,256 
there is even greater reason to think that bitcoin deflation will not harm users of the 
currency. Deflation has historically been unexpected,257 but in a bitcoin world, 
everyone would anticipate deflation, given the fixed supply of bitcoin, and know that 
what they were getting paid would have greater purchasing power.258 This type of 
predictability simply is not possible in a system of central banking, or in systems of 
private note issue, due to the inability of such systems to bind themselves to future 
behavior.259  
Third, there is yet a more fundamental reason that criticism of bitcoin’s 
deflationary model may prove irrelevant. Even if it were true that the societal worries 
about deflation are economically harmful, individuals will act in their own interest 
when deciding to hold bitcoin. While the deflationary spiral may alarm policy 
makers, individuals may find it in their own best interests to hold a currency that 
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increases in value in a predictable manner, rather than one that is open to the vagaries 
of central bank decision-making.  
6. Bitcoin’s Energy Consumption 
As bitcoin’s market adoption and price have soared to unprecedented levels, a 
new critique has emerged as the competition among miners to acquire newly minted 
bitcoin has attracted attention and resources. As bitcoin mining demands the 
consumption of energy, and that consumption scales almost linearly with the amount 
of computational resources being spent, many are now claiming that bitcoin use 
presents a serious global warming problem, and that the problem is only getting 
worse.260 
The statistics themselves do paint an alarming picture. Every bitcoin transaction 
now costs the same amount of energy as it takes to run a household for over a week.261 
Worldwide, bitcoin mining consumes more electricity than the entire country of 
Serbia.262 By one person’s calculations, bitcoin will require more electricity than the 
United States by July 2019, and by November 2020, it will consume more electricity 
than the entire world does today.263 
However, bitcoin mining may not be as environmentally unsustainable as certain 
critics have claimed. The environmental impact of mining gold is still far costlier 
than mining bitcoin. Annually, gold mining still consumes over eighteen times more 
electricity than bitcoin mining.264 But more importantly, bitcoin mining is 
geographically independent.265 That is, unlike gold mining, which requires energy 
consumption at the source of the physical mine, the task of mining for bitcoin can be 
performed anywhere on the planet. 
Why is this important? It means that miners can establish their enterprises in areas 
with cheap electricity. In fact, most bitcoin mining today happens in the Sichuan 
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Province of China.266 Sichuan is uniquely situated in that the region produces much 
more hydroelectric power than it can use.267 Similar to many energy projects in 
developing regions, Sichuan’s power plants were planned to meet electrical 
consumption demand fifty years from now. However, unlike oil and coal production, 
the amount of hydroelectric power produced by a given water source cannot be 
controlled, meaning that eighty-five percent of power currently generated in Sichuan 
is left unused, providing bitcoin miners an opportunity to generate profit while not 
impacting the environment.268  
Thus, bitcoin’s geographic independence has certain synergies with the economic 
costs required to build a renewable energy infrastructure.269 Unlike oil, renewable 
energy sources like wind, solar, and hydro are not easily stored, and as such, the 
excess amount of energy they generate can be allocated to mining for bitcoin without 
leaving a carbon footprint.270 This can enable capital expenditures for renewable 
energy plants to be more quickly amortized, which may stoke greater investment in 
infrastructure for a green economy.271  
 IV. BENCHMARKS FOR BITCOIN’S PRESENT AND FUTURE 
In this Part, we offer benchmarks for determining how bitcoin compares to other 
payment mechanisms and currencies. Our analysis provides a framework for analysis 
of the degree to which bitcoin will turn its potential into success as a currency. 
A. Currency Rungs—A Framework for Analyzing  
Bitcoin’s Growth as a Currency 
So far, this Article has explored bitcoin first as a fundamentally new regime of 
currency operating outside traditional legal mechanisms and then by examining the 
pros and cons of this regime. This Section offers a more specific framework for 
analyzing bitcoin’s growth and suitability as a currency by introducing the concept 
of a “currency rung.” A currency rung is a way to group different currencies by 
measuring (1) volatility over time and (2) its growth (or decline) in value as measured 
against other currencies. 
For a currency with a fixed supply, like bitcoin, these two forces may sometimes 
be at tension—although rampant speculation may drive up a currency’s value, the 
inherent volatility that comes along with such upward swings can be destabilizing 
for a currency.272 However, this tension is not a fatal flaw. If bitcoin maintains a 
slow, but steady, growth in demand, it will be able to maintain an acceptable level of 
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volatility while at the same time reaching a broader market. This opportunity for 
growth and lower volatility is propelled by the governments who manipulate their 
own currencies and thus lose the confidence of their citizenry. As shown in Figure 6, 
bitcoin’s price has continued to climb while its relative volatility dampens. 
 
FIGURE 6. BITCOIN PRICE AND VOLATILITY CHART  




As explained in Section III.B.4, there have been periods where speculation in 
bitcoin has driven its volatility upwards, which of course reduces its usefulness as a 
currency. While these periods of speculation create winners and losers in bitcoin 
trading markets,274 bitcoin’s ten-plus year history demonstrates that it can survive 
these growing pains as it matures into a usable currency. Indeed, as Figure 6 
demonstrates, volatility during the speculative cycles of late 2017 and 2018 was 
much lower than volatility during earlier periods of speculation such as late 2013 and 
early 2014. 
As more individuals enter bitcoin markets, we will likely see more and more 
established institutions participating in a bitcoin ecosystem. Already there are many 
more exchanges and wallets holding bitcoins. In late 2017, two exchanges offered 
futures markets on bitcoin.275 By offering a hedge against future price changes in 
bitcoin, these futures markets may expand the users of bitcoin and reduce 
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volatility.276 Thus, while it is far from a certainty, bitcoin’s qualitative advantages 
over fiat may allow it to climb currency rungs and compete with many currencies on 
a global scale.  
1. First Tier: Bitcoin vs. Reserve Currencies 
Currencies that instill sufficient confidence that they are widely held outside of 
their nation are called reserve currencies. 277 Briefly, foreign individuals and foreign 
institutions hold these currencies because their relatively low volatility and good 
prospects of holding their value makes them function well both as stores of value and 
as mechanisms to facilitate economic transactions, particularly foreign exchange and 
trade. 278 Reserve currencies thus are the top tiers of all currencies.  
It is important to recognize that although reserve currencies are more stable than 
others, over time some currencies can lose that status and others can gain it. Prior to 
World War I, the pound was the reserve currency.279 However, as explored in Part I, 
a government’s ability to isolate its currency from the pressures of politics is limited. 
After the war, the pound lost its status to the dollar, for a variety of reasons, including 
the relative independence of the Fed over the Bank of England.280  
By its structure, bitcoin has some potential advantages even over reserve 
currencies because it is not dependent on any government. Unlike bitcoin’s 
community of miners, governments have objectives other than preserving and 
enhancing the value of the currency and have historically pursued these objectives. 
Nonetheless, bitcoin is in its infancy and still far from competing directly with 
reserve currencies because of its substantially greater volatility.  
Despite its infancy and relative lack of appeal as a store of value against other 
reserve currencies, bitcoin’s qualitative features could potentially allow it to one day 
compete against state-issued fiat. Its underlying technology allows international 
transactions to be completed in seconds, making it useful in foreign exchange and 
trade. Additionally, bitcoin is a currency without political allegiance, which may 
make it attractive to nations who, for political reasons, may not wish to support 
another nation by driving up demand for its currency. 
Even if bitcoin becomes a reserve currency, it is doubtful that governments will 
simply give up printing their own currencies, but instead they will compete against 
bitcoin to offer superior forms of fiat than are currently available. Even today, central 
banks are exploring the idea of offering competing digital currencies. Recently, the 
Bank of England released a white paper where it explored the potential to replace the 
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pound with a “central bank digital currency” (CBDC).281 Unlike bitcoin, CBDC 
would be created whereby a central bank fixes the quantity of CBDC relative to GDP 
and releases the currency against government bonds.282 The Bank of England claims 
that CBDC would enable individuals to hold and transfer money without requiring a 
bank via blockchain technology that is similar to that of bitcoin.283 Even if successful, 
order without law in currency is thus not likely to entirely end the law of currency 
but rather to transform it. 
2. Second Tier: Bitcoin vs. Emerging Market Currencies 
But bitcoin does not need to compete against reserve currencies at first. Bitcoin’s 
best opportunity for maturing as a currency is by competing against nonreserve 
currencies, particularly in emerging markets. Because of the fragility of the laws 
respecting currencies in some of these nations,284 bitcoin is competing with some of 
those currencies already. While it is still more volatile than most of these currencies, 
that gap may be narrowing,285 and its appreciating value makes it an attractive option 
to those who distrust their government’s ability to maintain the value of its own 
currencies. A recent example of this is the explosive increase in the demand of bitcoin 
in Venezuela during its economic and political crises: 
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FIGURE 7. WEEKLY BITCOIN VOLUMES IN THE VENEZUELAN BOLIVAR  





Consider the currencies of three representative and important markets: Brazilian 
real (BRL), South African rand (ZAR), and Chinese yuan (CNY). First, all three 
emerging market currencies witnessed a sharp depreciation against the U.S. dollar 
during the past four years while bitcoin climbed in the same period. Second, with the 
exception of the speculative period in late 2017 and 2018, the gap in volatility 
between these currencies and bitcoin has shrunk compared to the early years of 
bitcoin: 
 
FIGURE 8. VOLATILITY OF BITCOIN VS. EMERGING MARKET CURRENCIES287 
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3. Third Tier: Bitcoin vs. Gold (The Commodity Tier) 
The third tier of currency is the “Commodity Tier.” Historically, currencies in this 
tier, such as gold and silver, are safe havens that investors flock to during times of 
financial panic as a substitute for fiat currencies and as a hedge against inflation 
and/or political uncertainty. Bitcoin and gold share certain similarities.288 Both are 
limited in supply.289 Bitcoin and gold both have functional utility: gold is desirable 
for use in jewelry and electronic circuits, and bitcoin is desirable for its usefulness in 
exchanging value. 
However, despite these similarities, bitcoin has some natural advantages over 
gold—lower storage costs and greater capacity to function as a payment system. 
Already, the market for bitcoin has functioned as an alternative to gold as a safe 
haven investment.290 During Cyprus’s severe banking crisis, the price of bitcoin 
doubled within the space of two weeks.291 Following the surprising outcome of the 
United Kingdom’s Brexit vote, the price of bitcoin surged, and exchanges offering 
to exchange bitcoin for the British pound “experienced a substantial increase in user 
sign ups.”292  
Indeed, while bitcoin’s volatility is still more than that of gold, its absolute return 
has far outpaced the precious metal.  
4. Fourth Tier: Bitcoin vs. Other Cryptocurrencies  
The final tier of currencies we define is cryptocurrencies. A cryptocurrency’s 
value is inherently tied to the ingenuity of the algorithm that produces it and the 
network of individuals who advocate for it and use it. At its inception, bitcoin was 
almost valueless—the first recorded bitcoin transaction was the purchase of two 
pizzas in Jacksonville, Florida, in 2010 for the price of 10,000 bitcoin.293 While other 
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cryptocurrencies have emerged, bitcoin has maintained its superiority not only in its 
overall value, but also in its growth as a more stable store of value. 
 
FIGURE 9. MAJOR CRYPTOCURRENCY MARKET CAPITALIZATION  
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B. Bitcoin’s Path Forward 
Thus, there is already evidence that bitcoin is climbing the rungs to become a 
more stable store of value. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to give a 
complete account of the forces helping bitcoin succeed, we can briefly offer three 
reasons. First, bitcoin has appeared to develop a more diversified participation base. 
As people from diverse backgrounds enter the market, demand is more likely to 
match up and real demand to cancel out speculative flows. Price stability results. The 
advantage of gaining worldwide participants is most apparent in the reserve 
currencies such as the U.S. dollar, euro, and Japanese yen. The same can be said 
about bitcoin as it has grown from a toy among a closed circle of geeks to a medium 
of exchange for a wider public.  
Second, bitcoin gains more users hedging against currency shocks in times of 
political and economic crises—Brexit, the American presidential election, and the 
refugee crisis to name just three. Central banks often react by easing the money 
supply to avoid liquidity concerns sparked by such crises.296 But monetary easing 
can raise concerns about inflation.297 In short as the political world becomes riskier, 
bitcoin seems less risky in comparison.  
Finally, the passage of time can help bitcoin. Bitcoin was an entirely novel human 
creation. Only time will tell whether an artifice is viable. Proponents of bitcoin are 
relieved to see it has survived hacks, scandals, peer group competition, and a general 
disapproval by governments. The price drop following the Bitfinex scandal in the 
middle of 2016 was much smaller in magnitude than when Mt. Gox collapsed in 
2014.298 When a market rumor swirled around in early November of 2016 that the 
Chinese government was about to regulate bitcoin trading to plug the loopholes in 
capital outflow, the price drop was almost negligible compared with when China’s 
central bank came close to banning bitcoin in late 2013.299 The more resilience 
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bitcoin exhibits in times of crisis, the more faith market participants place in its 
future. A positive feedback loop is thus entrenched. 
CONCLUSION 
Software is eating away even at a function as basic as currency. The digital 
revolution is evolving from a phenomenon that changed the way we communicate to 
an era that is producing innovations that disrupt many of our preconceived notions 
of law and governance. While it is unlikely that any cryptocurrency will dislodge the 
dollar or other major currency anytime soon, bitcoin’s striking growth over the last 
decade is proof that cryptocurrency has the potential to change the way individuals 
and societies exchange value. Its ultimate success is not yet assured, and that success 
likely depends on the ecosystem that grows up to surround it—an ecosystem that 
itself will depend on government regulation and established private law of property 
and contract. Nevertheless, bitcoin is significant not only for its own peculiar form 
of order without currency law, but also for establishing a platform that will help 
sustain other forms of nonlegal order. 
